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KILLING IN THE FOG OF WAR
ADIL AHMAD HAQUE†
ABSTRACT
How certain must a soldier be that a given individual is a
combatant and not a civilian before attacking that individual? In the
absence of clear legal rules, leading states, scholars, and practitioners have
embraced a Balancing Approach, according to which the required level of
certainty varies with the balance of military and humanitarian
considerations. However, the Balancing Approach ignores the moral
asymmetries between killing and letting die and between intentionally and
unintentionally killing civilians. As a result, the Balancing Approach
permits soldiers to intentionally kill individuals who are probably, much
more likely, or almost certainly civilians rather than combatants.
This article develops a deontological alternative to the Balancing
Approach. According to Deontological Targeting, a soldier may not
intentionally kill an individual whom she believes is a civilian or whom she
does not reasonably believe is a combatant. These constraints establish a
minimum threshold of certainty that soldiers must reach before using
deadly force. Furthermore, if an individual does not pose an immediate
threat then, except in rare cases, that individual may not be attacked unless
there is conclusive reason to believe that she is a combatant. In addition,
†

Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law–Newark. Earlier versions of
this paper were presented to the American Society of International Law Annual
Research Forum; the Criminal Justice Roundtable at Yale Law School; the
International Law and Legal Theory Roundtable at Washington University School
of Law; and the International Law Research Roundtable at St. John’s University
School of Law. Special thanks to Harlan Cohen, Evan Criddle, John Dehn, David
Glazier, Alexander Greenawalt, Amos Guiora, Andrew Hayashi, Maximo Langer,
Adriaan Lanni, Dan Markel, Jeff McMahan, Richard McAdams, Mary Ellen
O’Connell, Brandon Paradise, Leila Sadat, Mark Shulman, Jeffery Walker, and
Alan Weiner for their comments and suggestions. Thanks finally to Edward
Westfall and Kenneth Wagner for outstanding research assistance.

2012]

KILLING IN THE FOG OF WAR

2

soldiers must seek additional information regarding potential human targets
unless seeking additional information would increase the risk to the
soldiers substantially more than acquiring additional information would
decrease the risk to civilians. If soldiers are unwilling or unable to take the
risks necessary to achieve the required level of certainty then they must
hold their fire.
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INTRODUCTION
The great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar
difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be
planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not
infrequently—like the effect of a fog or moonshine—gives
to things exaggerated dimensions and unnatural
appearance.1
The point is that we're Marines. We're the toughest guys
on the block. We know how to defend ourselves. We know
how to aggressively take people down. And to suggest that
we can't do the shades of gray in between is a cop-out, and
I think it sells Marines short.2
Imagine that you are a soldier, ordered to protect a military or
diplomatic convoy as it passes through hostile territory, and you see a car
stopped by the side of the road ahead. Or imagine that you are stationed at
a security checkpoint and a car approaches despite signs and warnings
directing it to stop. The occupants of the car may be civilians, but they
may also be irregular forces waiting to attack. Or imagine that you are
sitting safely in an office, or on an airbase, piloting an Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV) by remote control, trying to determine whether the
individuals you see on your monitor are members of an implacable
insurgency or merely locals carrying arms for their own protection in a
dangerous area. Finally, imagine that you are the President of the United
States and that a team of intelligence analysts informs you that they are
“between forty and sixty per cent” confident that Al Qaeda leader Osama
bin Laden is living in a residential compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan,
surrounded by civilians.3
1

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR Book 2, Chapter 2, Paragraph 24.

2

Interview with Col. John Ewers, Staff Judge Advocate, 1st Marine Expeditionary
Force, FRONTLINE: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, PBS (Feb. 19, 2008),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/haditha/etc/script.html#ixzz1eBd8soBh.
3

Nicholas Schmidle, Getting Bin Laden: What happened that night in Abbottabad,
NEW YORKER, Aug. 8, 2011,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/08/08/110808fa_fact_schmidle?current
Page=all.

2012]

KILLING IN THE FOG OF WAR

5

What should you do? How certain must you be that the individuals
in front of you are opposing combatants, rather than civilians, before using
deadly force? What precautions must you take, what information must you
seek, and what risks must you accept in order to reduce the risk of
mistakenly killing civilians? How can the law of armed conflict, as well as
the rules of engagement promulgated by your armed forces, provide better
guidance to you as you make such determinations?
The urgency and importance of such questions is particularly clear
in irregular armed conflicts in which state armed forces face non-uniformed
adversaries intermingled with civilian populations. Moreover, recent
scholarship suggests that as many as 7 out of 10 civilian deaths caused by
U.S. armed forces in pre-planned military operations result from a failure to
verify that the target of the operation is military rather than civilian.4
Finally, the advent of UAVs creates an unprecedented opportunity to
submit target verification to determinate and morally defensible legal rules.
To provide moral and legal guidance to participants in
contemporary conflicts, this article deploys concepts and theories drawn
from the law of armed conflict, decision theory, criminal law, and moral
philosophy. It is, in that sense, a work of both intradisciplinary and
interdisciplinary legal scholarship.
As Part I explains, under the law of armed conflict (LOAC), also
known as international humanitarian law (IHL), soldiers are not permitted
to shoot first and ask questions later. On the contrary, soldiers must
distinguish between opposing combatants and civilians; do everything
feasible to verify that the individuals they target are combatants and not
civilians; consider individuals to be civilians in cases of doubt; and hold
their fire if it becomes apparent that a targeted individual is a civilian.
However, as the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC)—a
leading expositor of IHL—has commented, “the various provisions are
relatively imprecise and are open to a fairly broad margin of judgment.”5
In the absence of clear legal rules, the ICRC as well as several leading
states, scholars, and practitioners embrace what I will call ‘the Balancing
Approach’, according to which the required level of certainty varies with
the balance of military and humanitarian considerations. As the balance
4

Gregory S. McNeal, The U.S. Practice of Collateral Damage Estimation and
Mitigation (unpublished).
5

Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 679 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter
Protocol I Commentary].
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tips in favor of humanitarian considerations, the required level of certainty
rises; as the balance tips in favor of military considerations, the required
level of certainty falls.
As Part II explains, the Balancing Approach remains imprecise and
undertheorized. To date, no proponent of the Balancing Approach has
attempted to show how one could derive a specific level of certainty from
the balance of military and humanitarian considerations. Interestingly,
decision theory provides a method for deriving a precise level of certainty
from the relative costs of an erroneous decision. Unfortunately, by making
the Balancing Approach more precise we also reveal its serious flaws.
Most dramatically, the Balancing Approach ignores the moral asymmetries
between killing and letting die and between intentionally and
unintentionally killing civilians. As a result, the Balancing Approach
permits soldiers to intentionally kill individuals who are probably, much
more likely, or almost certainly civilians rather than combatants.
Part III develops an alternative approach to target verification that I
call ‘Deontological Targeting’. The moral and legal prohibition of
intentionally killing civilians entails that it is impermissible for a soldier to
intentionally kill an individual whom she believes is a civilian or whom she
believes is probably a civilian. Most importantly, I argue that it is both
unjustifiable and inexcusable for a soldier to intentionally kill a human
being whom she does not reasonably believe is a combatant. Reasonable
belief that an individual is a combatant therefore constitutes a minimum
threshold of certainty that soldiers must achieve before using deadly force.
Above the reasonable belief threshold, the required level of certainty
reflects the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die. Except in
rare cases, an individual who does not pose an immediate threat may not be
attacked unless there is conclusive reason to believe that she is a
combatant. I conclude by comparing my approach with a recent proposal
by Lt. Col. Geoffrey Corn.
Part IV argues that soldiers must accept any personal or operational
risks necessary to achieve the required level of certainty. If soldiers are
unable to reach the required level of certainty, or if they are unwilling to
accept the risks necessary to do so, then they must hold their fire even if
their forbearance will leave them at greater risk. Soldiers also have a
general moral obligation to take additional precautions to avoid mistakenly
killing civilians, including acquiring additional information regarding
potential targets, unless taking those precautions would increase the risk to
the soldiers substantially more than taking those precautions would
decrease the risk the soldiers impose on civilians. In developing the latter
argument I engage critically with important recent work by David Luban.
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Part V distills the moral principles defended in the previous
sections into new LOAC/IHL rules as well as reinterpretations of existing
LOAC/IHL rules. These legal rules are then translated into model Rules of
Engagement for training soldiers and guiding their conduct on the
battlefield. Properly trained soldiers generally will make better decisions
by following these simplified rules than by following existing law or by
attempting to engage in complex moral or legal reasoning while under fire.
U.S. Rules of Engagement, which typically require ‘Positive Identification’
of targets with ‘a reasonable certainty’ are constructively criticized.
The proposed reforms provide civilians far more protection than
they have received in recent asymmetric conflicts. Among other things, the
reforms preclude ‘firing blind’ into cars, crowds, or dwellings; the creation
of ‘free-fire’ zones as well as the declaration that an entire area or building
is ‘hostile’ and on that basis killing its occupants without positively
identifying each targeted individual as a combatant; as well as the ‘zerorisk’ policy of shelling buildings on the mere suspicion that the individuals
inside are combatants without taking meaningful steps to find out. Neither
force protection nor mission success can justify or excuse killing civilians
in these circumstances.
No set of legal rules can replace human judgment, eliminate human
error, or prevent armed conflict from claiming civilian lives. However, the
proposed reforms provide superior guidance to commanders and soldiers as
well as greater protection to civilians. If such progress is possible then it
must be pursued.
***
Two points of clarification are necessary before we begin. First,
the moral principles defended and the legal rules proposed in this article
apply to all participants in armed conflict who must determine whether an
individual is a legitimate target or an illegitimate target.6 However, for the
sake of convenience, this article generally refers to soldiers who must
determine whether an individual is a combatant or a civilian. Since
6

Legitimate targets include members of regular armed forces, members of
organized armed groups who perform a continuous combat function, and civilians
directly participating in hostilities. Illegitimate targets include civilians not
directly participating in hostilities, religious and medical personnel, detainees and
prisoners of war, as well as individuals who have surrendered or been rendered
hors de combat by illness or injury. See generally ICRC, INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Nils Melzer ed., 2009) [hereinafter DPH
GUIDANCE].
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civilians directly participating in hostilities are legitimate targets, in these
passages readers should understand ‘combatant’ to include civilians
directly participating in hostilities and should understand ‘civilian’ to
exclude civilians directly participating in hostilities.7 This terminological
clarification is important because in many contemporary conflicts the
challenge is precisely to distinguish civilians directly participating in
hostilities from civilians not directly participating in hostilities. The
principles defended and rules proposed in this article apply with particular
urgency to such contemporary conflicts.
In addition, for the purposes of this article, a soldier intentionally
kills an individual only if it is the soldier’s purpose, goal, or conscious
object to kill that individual. Such intentional killings of targeted
individuals are the primary subject of this article. By contrast, a soldier
who knowingly kills civilians as a side-effect of attacking a legitimate
target is primarily beholden to the proportionality principle that I have
discussed elsewhere.8
I. DISTINCTION AND PRECAUTION
The LOAC/IHL requires that soldiers distinguish between
opposing combatants and civilians and take precautions in attack to avoid
mistakenly killing civilians. These requirements receive their clearest
expression in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions but several
are also recognized as rules of customary international law. As we shall
see, the indeterminacy of these requirements has led leading states,
scholars, and practitioners to adopt a Balancing Approach to target
verification, according to which both the required level of certainty and the
required level of precaution varies with the balance of military and
humanitarian considerations.
A. DISTINCTION
First, “[i]n order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between
7

For example, the proposed rules would apply to a civilian intelligence operative
covertly participating in armed conflict who must determine whether or not a
civilian is directly participating in hostilities before attacking that civilian.
8

See Adil Ahmad Haque, Proportionality (in War), in THE INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS (Hugh LaFollette et al. eds., 2012).

8
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civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives.”9 The principle of distinction is
a well-established part of customary international humanitarian law.10 The
principle does not specify a level of certainty that soldiers must achieve or
a level of risk they should accept to achieve that level of certainty. The
drafting history provides little insight, as discussion of this principle
focused on the varying technological capacities of different armed forces to
distinguish between civilians and combatants, rather than on the level of
certainty with which this distinction must be made.11
Protocol I also states that “[i]n the conduct of military operations,
constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and
civilian objects.”12 The language of this provision, which suggests a legal
duty of care owed by soldiers to civilians, might gesture toward a duty to
accept some personal or operational risk to achieve an adequate level of
certainty. According to the ICRC, “[t]his provision appropriately
supplements the basic rule of Article 48 . . . which urges Parties to the
conflict to always distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants . . . . It is quite clear that by respecting this [latter] obligation
the Parties to the conflict will spare the civilian population . . . .”13 This
comment is somewhat misleading and in any case unhelpful. Even if a
soldier succeeds in distinguishing between civilians and combatants, she is
hardly guaranteed to spare the former: among other things, the soldier
must still select discriminating means and methods of warfare that can be
directed at combatants and away from civilians. Conversely, if the soldier
exercises adequate care then she cannot be faulted if her attempts to
distinguish civilians from combatants do not succeed. But the comment
tells us nothing about the level of care with which soldiers must attempt to
distinguish civilians from combatants. As A.P.V. Rogers concludes, “[t]he
9

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 48,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter
Protocol I] (emphasis added).
10

See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3 (2005) (“Rule 1. The parties to the
conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants.”).
11

See Protocol I Commentary, at 599-600.

12

Protocol I, art. 57 (emphasis added).

13

Protocol I Commentary, at 680.
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law is not clear as to the degree of care required of the attacker or the
degree of risk that he must be prepared to take.”14
In the absence of clear textual guidance, several scholars have
turned to the Balancing Approach to describe the required level of care. In
perhaps the most influential contemporary work on the ethics of armed
conflict, Michael Walzer writes that “the degree of risk that is permissible
[for soldiers to impose on civilians] is going to vary with the nature of the
target, the urgency of the moment, the available technology, and so on” and
concluded “that civilians have a right that ‘due care’ be taken” which
reflects the balance of the relevant variables.15
More recently, Matthew Waxman argues that soldiers should apply
a flexible standard of ‘reasonable care’ according to which “reasonableness
is judged in terms of costs to the attacker of performing more rigorous
analysis or expending scarce military resources.”16 As Waxman concedes,
“the reasonable care rule is disquieting. It vests belligerents with
considerable discretion in multifaceted balancing and legitimizes even
large-scale injury to innocent civilians under certain circumstances.”17
Specifically, if the standard of certainty is simply a function of the costs to
an attacking force of mistakenly sparing an opposing combatant and the
costs to a civilian of being mistakenly killed, then if the former even
slightly outweigh the latter it would appear ‘reasonable’ for a soldier to
attack an individual even if the soldier believes that individual is probably a
civilian. As we shall see in part II, this disquieting implication of the
Balancing Approach is the product of two more fundamental defects.

14

A.P.V. Rogers, Zero-Casualty Warfare, 82 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 165, 177
(2000).
15

MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 156 (1977).

16

Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty
and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1387 (2008).
See also Dakota S. Rudesill, Precision War and Responsibility: Transformational
Military Technology and the Duty of Care under the Laws of War, 32 YALE J.
INT’L L. 517 (2007).
17

Id. at 1393.
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B. DOUBT
Second, Protocol I states that “[i]n case of doubt whether a person
is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.”18 Since
civilians are not legitimate targets, this provision entails that ‘in case of
doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person’ may not be targeted.
Although “[s]ome States have written this rule into their military manuals .
. . . [o]thers have expressed reservations about the military ramifications of
a strict interpretation of such a rule.”19 Indeed, if the provision is
interpreted to mean that a soldier may never intentionally kill an individual
if there is any reason to doubt that the individual is a combatant (that is,
any reason to believe the individual is a civilian) then the provision would
prove highly restrictive. It is worth noting, however, that the Protocol does
not identify the degree of ‘doubt’ that would preclude a lawful attack.
Moreover, the ICRC has not endorsed the provision as a rule of customary
international law.
Tellingly, both France and the United Kingdom entered
reservations to the Protocol I provision, with the United Kingdom stating
that the provision “applies only in cases of substantial doubt” and with both
countries stating that the provision cannot override “a commander's duty to
protect the safety of troops under his command or to preserve his military
situation.”20 In other words, both France and the United Kingdom maintain
that it is lawful to attack an individual, despite substantial doubt that she is
a combatant, if mistakenly sparing her (if she turns out to be a combatant)
would jeopardize troop safety or mission success. The degree of doubt
sufficient to preclude attack would therefore seem to vary based on the
balance of military and humanitarian considerations.
18

Protocol I, art. 50 (emphasis added). See also Protocol I Commentary, at 611
(“According to the ICRC draft there was ‘presumption’ of civilian status, but this
concept led to some problems and the Working Group decided to replace
‘presumed’ by ‘considered’.”)
19

HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, at 24 (citing the military manuals of
Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Hungary, Kenya,
Madagascar, Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Yugoslavia). But see
id. (citing the reservations of France and the United Kingdom).
20

Reservation of the United Kingdom. See also Reservation of France. Rogers
seems to accept a similar interpretation. Cf. Rogers, at 181 (“In the event of doubt
about the nature of the target, an attack should not be carried out, with a possible
exception where failure to prosecute the attack would put attacking forces in
immediate danger.”)
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In light of conflicting state practice, the ICRC found it “fair to
conclude that when there is a situation of doubt, a careful assessment has to
be made under the conditions and restraints governing a particular situation
as to whether there are sufficient indications to warrant an attack. One
cannot automatically attack anyone who might appear dubious.”21 The
quoted passage indicates that, according to the ICRC, the principle of doubt
means only that a soldier may not intentionally kill an individual whom she
is reasonably certain is a civilian just because there is some reason to doubt
that the individual is a civilian or, put the other way around, just because
there is some reason to believe that the individual is a combatant. This is,
to put it mildly, a very low bar. To accommodate states that fear a
restrictive interpretation of the principle of doubt, the ICRC adopted one of
the most permissive interpretations possible. So interpreted, the principle
seems to permit intentionally killing an individual who is most likely a
civilian if there is a substantial possibility that she is a combatant (that is,
more than a reasonable doubt that she is a civilian). In the vast majority of
cases, this interpretation will prove far too permissive.
More recently, the ICRC has stated that the level of doubt that
precludes attack is not fixed but rather varies with the possible
consequences, for soldiers and civilians, of an erroneous decision:
Obviously, the standard of doubt
applicable to targeting decisions cannot be
compared to the strict standard of doubt
applicable in criminal proceedings but
rather must reflect the level of certainty
that can reasonably be achieved in the
circumstances. In practice, this
determination will have to take into
account, inter alia, the intelligence
available to the decision maker, the
urgency of the situation, and the harm
likely to result to the operating forces or to
persons and objects protected against
direct attack from an erroneous decision.22
21

HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, at 24. See also Protocol I Commentary, at
612 (concluding that the principle of doubt “concerns persons who have not
committed hostile acts, but whose status seems doubtful because of the
circumstances. They should be considered to be civilians until further information
is available, and should therefore not be attacked.”)
22

DPH GUIDANCE, at 76.
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Similarly, Ian Henderson writes that “[i]t cannot be expected that armed
conflict will be reduced to the point where a commander can act only when
he or she is 100 percent certain in all cases. Rather, the level of certainty
should vary based on the consequences for the civilian population.”23
Finally, a recent document reflecting the consensus of a group of
distinguished experts states that “[t]he degree of doubt necessary to
preclude an attack is that which would cause a reasonable attacker in the
same or similar circumstances to abstain from ordering or executing an
attack.”24 Notice that, in this formulation, the degree of doubt that would
lead a reasonable attacker to abstain from attacking must vary based on the
circumstances; otherwise, the reference to such circumstances would be
superfluous. It follows that, in some circumstances, a reasonable attacker
might attack even in the face of substantial doubt; in other circumstances, a
reasonable attacker might abstain from attack in the face of even slight
doubt. The group of experts does not adopt a fixed standard of certainty
but rather adopts a variable standard. Unfortunately, the group of experts
does not identify the relevant variables. However, it would be difficult to
argue that a reasonable attacker would never consider the costs of an
erroneous decision in deciding whether or not to attack despite some degree
of doubt. So it would seem that the degree of doubt sufficient to preclude
attack varies with the relative costs of error.
C. VERIFICATION
Third, Protocol I states that “those who plan or decide upon an
attack shall . . . do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be
attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to
special protection but are military objectives . . . .”25 This provision is also
23

IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING: MILITARY
OBJECTIVES, PROPORTIONALITY AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK UNDER
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I, at 164 (2009).
24

COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 87 (2010) (hereinafter HPCR
MANUAL COMMENTARY). See also Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in
International Humanitarian Law, ISRAEL Y.B. HUMAN RIGHTS 17, 56-57 (20__)
(“In all cases of doubt, the appropriate international humanitarian law standard on
the battlefield is whether a reasonable warfighter in [the] same or similar
circumstances would hesitate to act based on the degree of doubt he harbored.”)
Schmitt was one of the experts who contributed to the HPCR Manual.
25

Protocol I, art. 57(2)(a) (emphasis added).
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recognized as a statement of customary international law.26 This provision
raises at least two sets of questions. First, what level of certainty is
required to ‘verify’ the legitimacy of a target? Is the legitimacy of a target
verified if it is probably military rather than civilian, much more likely
military than civilian, or almost certainly military and not civilian?
Second, how much risk, if any, must soldiers accept to themselves or to the
success of their mission in order to ‘do everything feasible’ to verify the
legitimacy of their target? If the information soldiers already have or could
safely acquire is insufficient to warrant the level of certainty required for
‘verification’ must they seek additional information at additional risk?
In its original commentary on Protocol I, the ICRC stated that “in
case of doubt, even if there is only slight doubt, [those who plan or decide
upon an attack] must call for additional information and if need be give
orders for further reconnaissance.”27 This comment suggests that the level
of certainty required to verify the legitimacy of a target is extremely high,
so high as to exclude even “slight doubt.” Moreover, the comment
suggests that soldiers must engage in reconnaissance, accepting risks to
themselves, to gather enough information to satisfy the required level of
certainty. However, as we saw above, the ICRC no longer maintains that
the LOAC/IHL requires such a high level of certainty but instead
recognizes a variable level of certainty in keeping with the Balancing
Approach.28
Although Protocol I does not define the phrase ‘everything
feasible’, Protocols II and III to the Conventional Weapons Convention
(CWC) state that “[f]easible precautions are those precautions which are
practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances
ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.”29
26

See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, at 55 (“Rule 16. Each party to the conflict
must do everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives.”)
27

Protocol I Commentary, at 680. See also id. at 681 (“The evaluation of the
information obtained must include a serious check of its accuracy.”)
28
29

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices (Protocol II) art. 3(4), as amended May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 133;
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons
(Protocol III) art. 1(5), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171. See also Lt. Col.
William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional
Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 108 (1982) (concluding, based on the statements of
the United States, Germany and Italy during the drafting process, that “‘feasible’ in
Article 57(2)(a) means ‘practicable or practically possible’”).
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The ICRC has stated that the definition of ‘feasible precautions’ under the
CWC Protocols provides the definition of ‘everything feasible’ under
Protocol I.30 Unfortunately, the CWC Protocols define the vague notion of
what is ‘feasible’ in terms of the equally vague notion of what is
‘practicable or practically possible’ and a sweeping reference to all
circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military
considerations. In light of this indeterminacy, the ICRC now limits itself to
stating that “[t]his determination [of feasibility] must be made in good faith
and in view of all information that can be said to be reasonably available in
the specific situation.”31 No required level of certainty is proposed, and
soldiers are not called upon to risk themselves or their mission to obtain
additional information.32
In the absence of clear textual guidance, leading scholars have
turned to the Balancing Approach to describe the precautions that soldiers
must take to verify that their targets are military and not civilian. For
example, Michael Schmitt argues that the “feasibility [of a precaution]
must be interpreted by balancing humanitarian and military considerations.
. . . By this analysis, the greater the anticipated collateral damage or
incidental injury, the greater the risk [soldiers] can reasonably be asked to
shoulder.”33 Relatedly, a group of distinguished experts of which Schmitt
is a member concludes that the feasibility of precautions often depends on
30

DPH GUIDANCE, at 75.

31

DPH Study, at 75. See also YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES
UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 126 (2004) (characterizing the
principle of verification as “an obligation of due diligence and acting in good
faith.”)
32

Similarly, the Advisory Committee to the Office of the Prosecutor for the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concludes that
“[t]he obligation to do everything feasible is high but not absolute. A military
commander must set up an effective intelligence gathering system to collect and
evaluate information concerning potential targets. The commander must also direct
his forces to use available technical means to properly identify targets during
operations.” See Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by
the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, para. 29 (June 13, 2000), available at http://
www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf. The Report does not address either the
level of certainty required ‘to properly identify targets during operations’ or what
risks, if any, soldiers are obliged to undertake in order to reach that level of
certainty.
33

Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 445, 462 (2005).
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considerations of force protection, suggesting that the required precautions
vary based on the weight of military considerations.34 Similarly, Geoffrey
Corn argues that the feasibility inquiry permits attackers to balance the risk
to their own forces against the risk of mistakenly attacking civilians.35
Finally, Matthew Waxman concludes that “[t]he responsibility to ‘do
everything feasible’ [to verify the legitimacy of potential targets] . . . is
generally interpreted to be not a fixed and always highly exacting duty—
like, say, the beyond reasonable doubt approach of criminal law—but a
balancing one: Parties are obliged to balance humanitarian concerns for
civilians with military needs.”36
Before moving on, it is worth noting that many states have
incorporated the principle of verification into their military manuals. Few
states have identified the level of certainty, either fixed or variable, that
qualifies as ‘verification’.37 With respect to the level of risk soldiers must
accept in order to achieve verification, most states simply follow Protocol I
in requiring their forces to do everything feasible to achieve target
verification38; some cast the requirement in terms of what is ‘reasonable’ or
‘practical’39; and some prefer different, but equally open-textured
34

HPCR MANUAL COMMENTARY, at 136.

35

See Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Principle 3: Endeavor to Prevent or Minimize
Harm to Civilians, 1998 ARMY LAW 55, 55-56 (“Feasibility provides a limited
mechanism to bypass applying certain rules related to minimizing civilian harm
when application would be harmful to the force.”).
36

Waxman, supra note 16, at 1388 (2008).

37

A possible exception is Belgium, which instructs its forces that an object can be
attacked only when it reasonably can be considered a military objective. See
Belgium’s Teaching Manual for Soldiers.
38

See, e.g., Australia; Canada; Kenya’s LOAC Manual (1997); New Zealand’s
Military Manual (1992); UK LOAC Manual (2004); US Air Force Pamphlet
(1976).
39

See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE Appendix A-v (1956) (stating that “[t]hose who plan or decide upon an
attack, therefore, must take all reasonable steps to ensure . . . that the objectives are
identified as military objectives of defended places”); US Naval Handbook (1995)
(“All reasonable precautions must be taken to ensure that only military objectives
are targeted.”); Argentina’s Manual (“Those who plan or decide upon an attack
shall, as far as possible, verify that the objectives to be attacked are not civilians,
nor civilian objects, nor subject to special protection.”); Cameroon’s Instructors’
Manual (1992) (requiring that “those who plan or decide upon an attack do
everything that is practically possible to verify that the targets to be attacked are
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formulations.40 Only two small states explicitly require that “[a]ll
necessary measures must be taken to verify that the target to be destroyed is
a military objective.”41 However, a number of states impose an unqualified
duty to verify the status of targets, which seems to imply that their forces
must take all necessary risks to achieve the (unspecified) required level of
certainty.42 In addition, three states explicitly require reconnaissance,
which generally places troops in harm’s way.43 As these different
instructions make clear, there is no consensus among states regarding either
the level of certainty required for verification or the level of risk soldiers
must accept to achieve verification.

military objectives”); Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) (“All reasonable precautions
must be taken to ensure that only military objectives are targeted.”).
40

See, e.g., Israel’s Manual on the Laws of War (1998) (“In any attack it is
imperative to verify that the attack will be directed against a specific military
target.”)
41

Benin’s Military Manual (1995); Togo’s Military Manual (1996). In addition,
Denmark instructs its forces that “[c]ombatants must do everything in their power
to verify that the objects to be attacked are not protected under IHL.” See
Denmark Military Manual.
42

See, e.g., France’s LOAC Manual (2001) (providing that those who plan or
decide upon an attack must “verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither
civilians nor civilian objects”), Germany’s Military Manual (1992) (“Before
engaging an objective, every responsible military leader shall verify the military
nature of the objective to be attacked.”), Hungary’s Military Manual (1992)
(imposing a duty to “verify the military character of objectives and targets”), The
Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands (“During the selection of targets and
the preparation of attacks, it must be verified that the objectives to be attacked are
neither civilians nor civilian objects but are military objectives.”); Sweden’s IHL
Manual (1991) (“The responsible commander shall verify that the attack is really
directed against a military objective and not against [a] civilian population or
civilian objects.”)
43

See Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) (“The military character of the objective shall
be verified by reconnaissance and target identification.”); Italy’s LOAC
Elementary Rules Manual (1991) (“The military character of the objective shall be
verified by reconnaissance and target identification.”); Madagascar’s Military
Manual (1994) (“The military character of an objective or target must be verified
by reconnaissance and target identification.”)
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D. APPARENT PROTECTION
Finally, Protocol I states that “an attack shall be cancelled or
suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or
is subject to special protection.”44 This provision is also recognized as a
rule of customary international humanitarian law.45 The ICRC remarks that
“[t]he text is sufficiently clear for lengthy comment to be superfluous”46
but there are at least two textual ambiguities that must be resolved. First, is
it ‘apparent’ that an objective is civilian and not military if, given available
information, it is probably (that is, more likely) civilian rather than military,
much more likely civilian than military, or almost certainly civilian and not
military? Second, does the provision apply only when the protected status
of an objective is subjectively apparent to the actual attacker or does it also
apply when the protected status of an object would be objectively apparent
to a reasonable attacker faced with the same information?
The ICRC comments, by way of illustration, that “an airman who
has received the order to machine-gun troops travelling along a road, and
who finds only children going to school, must abstain from attack.”47 This
example suggests that an attack must be cancelled or suspended only if, as
a result of new information, the actual attacker comes to subjectively
believe that a person or object is almost certainly civilian rather than
military.48 At best, the ICRC Commentary leaves the textual ambiguities
unresolved; at worst, the Commentary gives the provision an extremely
narrow construction. In either case, the narrow and indeterminate scope of
the provision offers little guidance in situations of significant uncertainty.
To provide greater guidance to soldiers and greater protection to civilians
44

Protocol I, art. 57(2)(b) (emphasis added).

45

See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, at 60 (“Rule 19. Each party to the conflict
must do everything feasible to cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent
that the target is not a military objective . . . .”)
46

Protocol I Commentary, at 686.

47

Protocol I Commentary, at 686.

48

See also id. at 686 (“It is principally by visual means—in particular, by means of
aerial observation—that an attacker will find out that an intended objective is not a
military objective, or that it is an object entitled to special protection.”). Here too,
the phrases “finds out”, “is not”, and “is” imply that an attack must be cancelled or
suspended only if the attacker is almost certain that an object is not military or is
otherwise protected. See also HPRC MANUAL COMMENTARY, at 130 (stating that
an attacker must cancel or suspend an attack “when it becomes apparent to them”
that an object is not a lawful target) (emphasis added).
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we must integrate the law with a moral theory of killing in the fog of war.
It is to the search for such a theory that we now turn.
II. THE BALANCING APPROACH AND ITS LIMITS
As we have seen, in the absence of clear legal rules, the ICRC as
well as leading states and scholars have adopted the Balancing Approach to
target verification. According to the Balancing Approach, the level of
certainty required to permissibly attack an individual varies with the
balance of relevant military and humanitarian considerations. Until now,
proponents of the Balancing Approach have not explained how to weigh
military considerations against humanitarian considerations or how to
derive the required level of certainty from the resulting balance. As one
scholar observes, “[h]umanitarian considerations would require a pilot to
get close to the target to identify it properly; military considerations would
require the pilot to fly at a safe height to be at reduced risk from antiaircraft fire. This is a conflict that cannot be resolved easily.”49 However,
this part argues that decision theory provides a method for deriving the
required level of certainty from the relative costs of error.
Unfortunately, by clarifying the Balancing Approach we also
expose its serious flaws. The Balancing Approach implausibly entails that
soldiers may attack individuals whom they believe are probably civilians if
the potential harm to soldiers even slightly outweighs the potential harm to
civilians. The implausibility of this result is best explained by two moral
asymmetries. The asymmetry between killing and letting die explains why
it is substantially worse to kill a civilian than to allow a soldier to be killed,
even though the loss of human life in each case is the same. The
asymmetry between intentionally and unintentionally killing the innocent
explains why it is far worse to intentionally kill an individual correctly
believing her to be a civilian than to intentionally kill an individual
mistakenly believing her to be a combatant, even though both the loss of
human life and the causal structure of the action is the same. These two
moral asymmetries doom the Balancing Approach and ground the
alternative, deontological approach to targeting developed in Part III.
A. UNCERTAINTY
Proponents of the Balancing Approach have never explained how
to derive a required level of certainty from the balance of military and
49

Rogers, at 175.
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humanitarian considerations. This neglect leaves the Balancing Approach
imprecise and conceals its flaws. Fortunately, the entire field of decision
theory is devoted to determining how to make rational decisions in the
context of factual uncertainty. On most views, our primary goal when
faced with uncertainty should be error reduction. For example, in a
criminal trial, our primary purpose is to learn the truth about past events so
we may convict the guilty and acquit the innocent. We seek to avoid both
false convictions and false acquittals. Similarly, the primary goal of a
soldier, in the context of our discussion, is to accurately distinguish
between civilians and combatants so she may spare the former and kill or
capture the latter. Soldiers should seek to reduce both the number of
civilians they mistakenly harm and the number of opposing combatants
they mistakenly spare. It follows that, before attacking an individual,
soldiers should gather as much relevant information about that individual
as they can without risking themselves or their mission. Soldiers should
then evaluate the information they gather based on its cumulative probative
weight discounted by any possible prejudicial impact.
Unfortunately, we can reduce but never completely avoid
erroneous decisions. Some residual uncertainty will always remain despite
our best efforts, and as a result we will inevitably make mistakes. Hence
our secondary, fallback goal when faced with uncertainty should be error
distribution. Given that we will make errors, we must determine which
errors are more costly and which we should therefore try harder to avoid.
Our judgment regarding the relative costs of error are reflected in a
standard of certainty which, if consistently followed, will yield over time
the lowest total cost of error. For example, in criminal law, our judgment
that convicting an innocent defendant (a false positive or Type I error) is
much worse than acquitting a guilty defendant (a false negative or Type II
error) is reflected in the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
which yields over time far fewer false convictions than false acquittals.
Similarly, the level of certainty a soldier must achieve before killing an
individual should reflect a moral judgment regarding the relative moral
weight of killing a civilian and allowing oneself, one’s fellow soldiers, or
other civilians to be killed.
In principle, one can calculate the level of certainty required to
make a rational decision based on the relative costs of false positives and
false negatives.50 Specifically, the probability P of a claim C given the
50

See, e.g., ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 15-16 (2005). See also
id. at 149 (using a different formula to fix the required level of certainty, according
to which the odds that a claim is true, given the evidence, must be greater than the
ratio of the costs of a false positive to the costs of a false positive: O(C|E) >
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evidence E must be greater than the following function of the costs of a
false positive (D+) and a false negative (D-):
P(C|E) > 1/(1 +

(!!)
(!!)

)

Given plausible assumptions, this function can yield plausible results. For
example, if convicting an innocent defendant of a crime generally is ten
times worse than acquitting a guilty defendant of a crime, then the level of
certainty required for criminal conviction will be very high:
P(C|E) > 1/(1 +

!
!"

)    = 1/1.1   =    .91

Presumably, greater-than-91% certainty is a fair approximation of the
criminal law standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. By contrast, if a
false judgment for a tort plaintiff is neither better nor worse than a false
judgment for a tort defendant then the level of certainty required to find for
the plaintiff will be just barely higher than the level of certainty required to
find for the defendant:
!

P(C|E) > 1/(1 + ) = 1/2 = .50
!

Presumably, greater-than-50% certainty is a fair approximation of the
private law standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Before using this formula to clarify the Balancing Approach, it is
worth pausing to consider the formula’s moral foundations. One account,
offered by many decision theorists, is that decision-makers should adopt
decision rules that will minimize the total cost of the errors they will make
over the long term. The total cost of error, in turn, depends on the relative
costs of the different errors one might make. In order to minimize the total
cost of error, decision-makers should adopt a decision rule that will lead
them to make more less-costly errors and fewer more-costly errors. The
standard of certainty is a mechanism for skewing decisions in favor of less(D(+)/D(-)). Larry Laudan and Harry Saunders have impressively argued that, on
a conceptual level, the standard of certainty should also reflect the value of true
positives and true negatives. See, e.g., Larry Laudan & Harry Saunders, ReThinking the Criminal Standard of Proof: Seeking Consensus about the Utilities of
Trial Outcomes, XX _____ XX (20XX). However, in the context of armed
conflict, true negatives do not appear to have significant benefits other than
avoiding the costs of false positives, and true positives do not appear to have
significant benefits other than avoiding the costs of false negatives. Consideration
of true positives and true negatives should not affect the required standard of
certainty. I will therefore use the more conventional and widely-accepted formula
for calculating the required standard of certainty.
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costly errors. In other words, since we can reduce but never eliminate the
risk of error, we should distribute any residual risk of error so as to
minimize the total cost of error.
All of this may sound uncomfortably consequentialist, but it need
not. We could just as easily say that our primary goal is to avoid
committing serious moral wrongs; that, given factual uncertainty, we will
unavoidably fail and end up committing some such wrongs; that the best
we can do is try to reduce the overall seriousness of the wrongs we commit;
and that we must therefore act in the face of uncertainty in a way that
reflects the relative seriousness of different wrongs. For example, it is
wrong to convict the innocent and wrong to acquit the guilty.
Unfortunately, we can reduce but not eliminate the risk of mistakenly
committing one wrong or the other. Since the former is a much more
serious wrong than the latter, we should convict only with a level of
certainty that will lead us to inadvertently commit the more serious wrong
(false conviction) much less often than the less serious wrong (false
acquittal). We will thereby reduce the overall seriousness of the wrongs we
inadvertently commit.
B. THE BALANCING APPROACH REVISITED
We now can see how decision theory can enhance the determinacy
of the Balancing Approach. In the context of target verification, soldiers
may err in two ways: by mistakenly identifying a civilian as a combatant
and then killing her (a false positive), or by mistakenly identifying a
combatant as a civilian and then sparing her (a false negative). False
positives carry obvious costs to civilians while false negatives carry
significant costs to the attacking force. According to decision theory, the
level of certainty a soldier must posses that an individual is a combatant
and not a civilian before using deadly force can be represented as a
function of the relative costs of a false positive and a false negative.
Importantly, the relative costs of error to civilians and to the attacking force
will vary from case to case, so the required level of certainty will vary as
well. In other words, the required level of certainty varies with the balance
of military and humanitarian considerations, just as the Balancing
Approach proposes.
To simplify the following discussion, let us assume that the cost of
a false positive is that you will kill a civilian and the cost of a false negative
is that you will spare a combatant who may go on to kill one or more of
your fellow soldiers. This is no more than a simplifying assumption,
subject to three important qualifications.

2012]

KILLING IN THE FOG OF WAR

23

First, the costs of both killing civilians and (particularly) sparing
combatants vary from case to case. On one hand, while every false positive
involves the death of a civilian, not every false negative results in the death
of a fellow soldier. Not every opposing combatant makes a necessary
contribution to lethal operations such that killing her will prevent even one
fellow soldier from being killed, and mistakenly spared combatants will
often be killed in future engagements before they can kill even one fellow
soldier.51 In addition, according to contemporary counterinsurgency
theory, killing an insurgent may have little strategic benefits since her death
may inspire others to take up arms, while killing a civilian may have
strategic costs by turning the civilian population against one’s forces.52 On
the other hand, the death of a combatant not only eliminates the threat she
poses but also may (perhaps temporarily) deplete the opposing force. In
some cases, a combatant who is mistakenly spared at one time may become
more dangerous or more difficult to kill or capture later. In addition, the
deaths of soldiers at the hands of mistakenly spared combatants may place
other soldiers at greater risk or jeopardize the success of a mission or, over
time, the success of the war effort. It seems to me that these variables
offset one another to a sufficient degree that it is unlikely that their net
weight would significantly change the conclusions of this part.
Second, often a soldier who kills a suspected combatant will also
unintentionally but knowingly kill one or more civilians as a side-effect of
her attack. In such cases, the soldier must not only reach the required level
of certainty that the targeted individual is a combatant but also ensure that
the expected military advantage of killing that individual (that is, the value
of killing her if she is a combatant, discounted by the likelihood that she is
a combatant) substantially outweighs the unintended loss of civilian life.53
Finally, the costs of error will themselves be uncertain, so strictly
speaking we should compare the average expected costs of error, that is,
the average of the possible costs of an erroneous decision discounted by
their respective probabilities. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity we
will assume that the average expected costs of error are that either a soldier
will kill a civilian or that a spared combatant may kill one or more soldiers.
51

In criminal law, we can sometimes correct false convictions but can never
correct false acquittals. In armed conflict, the opposite is the case; there are no
appeals, but there is double jeopardy.
52

See, e.g., DAVID PETRAEUS, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., THE U.S. ARMY AND MARINE
CORPS COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL (U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24,
2006).
53

See Haque, Proportionality (in War).
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We should start from the assumption that the death of a civilian
and the death of a soldier are equally bad outcomes. Civilians and soldiers
are, after all, human beings. Accordingly, it would seem that even if the
cost of a false negative is the death of only one soldier the required level of
certainty would be fairly low:
!

P(C|E) > 1/(1 + )  = 1/2 = .50
!

In other words, it seems that on the Balancing Approach it is permissible to
kill an individual whom you believe is only slightly more likely a
combatant than a civilian in order to prevent one soldier from being killed
if the individual turns out to be a combatant. Moreover, it seems that if the
cost of a false negative is the death of two fellow soldiers then the required
level of certainty is even lower:
!

P(C|E) > 1/(1 + ) = 1/3 = .33
!

In other words, according to the Balancing Approach, it is permissible for a
soldier to intentionally kill an individual whom the soldier is reasonably
certain is a civilian (indeed, whom the soldier reasonably estimates is twice
as likely a civilian than a combatant) in order to prevent two soldiers from
being killed if the individual turns out to be a combatant. Put another way,
a soldier may take a 66% chance of killing a civilian to avoid a 33% chance
of allowing two soldiers to be killed. These results seem implausible.
Why?
C. LIMITS: KILLING AND LETTING DIE
The fact that soldiers and civilians are human beings whose lives
are equal in value does not entail that their deaths should count equally in
determining the relative costs of error. We must also consider how their
deaths come about—how their deaths are causally related to our conduct.54
Specifically, there is a moral asymmetry between killing a human being
and letting a human being die.55 This moral asymmetry manifests itself is
54

The idea that the permissibility of our actions depends not only on their
consequences but also on their causal structure is an essential part of any
nonconsequentialist moral theory. See, e.g., F.M. Kamm, Towards the Essence of
Nonconsequentialist Constraints, in FACT AND VALUE (A. Byrne, et al. eds., 2001).
55

As Jeff McMahan observes, “[v]irtually all of us, even consequentialists, act on
the presupposition that the constraint against harmful killing is in general stronger
than the constraint against harmfully allowing someone to die, when all other
relevant factors, such as intention, are the same in both cases.” Jeff McMahan, The
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several important ways. Most importantly, it is not morally permissible to
kill one innocent person either as means or as a side-effect of preventing
another innocent person from being killed.56 It is not permissible to
intentionally kill one person as a means of preventing several others from
being killed (say, by using the healthy organs of one person to replace the
damaged organs of several others). Nor is it permissible to unintentionally
kill one person as a side-effect of preventing one other person from being
killed (say, by throwing a grenade at an attacker surrounded by innocent
bystanders). Forced to choose between killing one innocent person and
allowing another innocent person to die we must choose the latter.
In contrast, absent special obligations, generally it is permissible to
allow an innocent person to die as a means or as a side-effect of preventing
several others from being killed. For example, generally it is permissible to
use limited medication to save several people even if, as a side-effect, one
other person will die without that medication. In addition, if removing one
person from danger will expose several others to the same danger then
generally it is permissible to allow the one person to die as a means of
protecting the several. Finally, generally it is impermissible to kill an
innocent person to avoid serious harm to yourself, but generally it is
permissible to allow an innocent person to die if rescuing her from danger
would involve serious harm to yourself. Each of the asymmetric outcomes
described above are rooted in the general moral asymmetry between killing
and letting die. We can refer to this asymmetry by saying that killing is
morally worse, or harder to justify, than letting die.57
If killing generally is worse than letting die, then, even if the lives
of civilians and the lives of soldiers have equal moral value, generally it is
Just Distribution of Harm Between Combatants and Noncombatants, 38
PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 342, 369 (2010).
56

See also id. (“This moral asymmetry between killing and letting die provides,
among other things, part of the explanation of why it is impermissible to kill an
innocent bystander as a means of preserving one’s own life, and perhaps the full
explanation of why it is impermissible to kill an innocent bystander as a side effect
of defending or preserving one’s own life.”)
57

Significantly, in some cases unjustifiable killing and unjustifiable letting die may
be equally morally blameworthy. See, e.g., James Rachels, Active and Passive
Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78 (1975) (comparing the drowning of a child
to inherit a large fortune with allowing a child to drown for the same reason).
However, the preceding discussion shows that killing is harder to justify than
letting die, and is worse in that sense.
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worse to kill a civilian than to allow a soldier to be killed.58 If you are
deciding whether to kill an individual who might be a civilian or possibly
allow a fellow soldier to be killed, then generally you should err in favor of
the latter, generally lesser wrong. More precisely, if killing a civilian is
substantially worse than allowing a soldier to be killed, you may not kill an
individual unless she is at least equally substantially more likely (or
proportionately more likely) a combatant than a civilian. For example, if
killing a civilian is twice as bad as allowing a soldier to be killed, then you
may not kill an individual unless she is at least twice as likely a combatant
rather than a civilian (67% versus 33%); if three times as bad then three
times as likely (75% versus 25%); and so on.
One might think that the moral asymmetry between killing and
letting die is offset by the moral obligations of soldiers to protect one
another. Such associative obligations may be very strong. Many soldiers
feel obligated to risk their own lives to defend their fellow soldiers from
attack, to carry those who are wounded, and to rescue those who are
captured. However, there are at least three reasons why such associative
obligations do not substantially offset the moral asymmetry between killing
civilians and allowing soldiers to be killed.
First, generally it is not permissible to shift risks from one person
onto another person who has not voluntarily assumed those risks; in such
cases, the risks must lie where they fall.59 If those at risk have voluntarily
assumed those risks then it is even harder to justify shifting those risks onto
others who have not voluntarily assumed those risks. Since soldiers
generally assume the risks of combat voluntarily while civilians generally
do not, it is even harder for soldiers to justify shifting risks from
themselves onto civilians. Of course, many soldiers are conscripted or join
58

Does the asymmetry between killing and letting die also entail that it is worse to
kill an opposing combatant than to allow a soldier to be killed, since combatants
are also human beings whose lives have equal moral vale? No. It is generally
permissible to kill a lethal attacker in self-defense or defense of others. Soldiers
fighting for a just cause have a moral right to kill opposing combatants to defend
themselves and their fellow soldiers from lethal attack. For further discussion see
Adil Ahmad Haque, Criminal Law and Morality at War, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 481 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011).
59

See Haque, Proportionality (in War). In some cases, it may be permissible to
redirect a pre-existing threat from several people to one person. See, e.g., Judith
Jarvis Thompson, The Trolley Problem, 94 Yale L.J. 94 1395 (1985). But
generally it is impermissible to redirect a pre-existing threat from one person to
one other person. Certainly, generally it is not permissible to create a new risk of
harm to one person in order to avert a pre-existing risk of harm to another person.
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the military to escape poverty. However, generally it is not permissible to
kill innocent people to avoid punishment or escape poverty.
Second, the notion that associative obligations can help justify
killing civilians is itself highly dubious. As McMahan observes, “a third
party acting to defend another person may in general cause no more harm
to innocent bystanders than the person he is defending would be permitted
to cause by acting in self-defense. And most people agree that it is not
permissible for a person to defend her own life if in doing so she would
unavoidably kill an innocent bystander as a side effect.”60 Similarly,
Walzer observes that an officer “cannot save [the soldiers under her
command], because they cannot save themselves, by killing innocent
people.”61
Finally, it is both morally and legally impermissible to indirectly
cause the death of a civilian either as a means of saving oneself or another
soldier (for example, by using a civilian as a human shield) or as a sideeffect of saving oneself or another soldier (for example, by hiding among
civilians). It could hardly be permissible to directly cause the death of a
civilian in order to save oneself or another soldier.
The preceding discussion also explains why it remains worse for a
soldier to kill a civilian than to allow another civilian to be killed, even if
the soldier has a stronger moral obligation to protect some civilians than to
protect other civilians.62 If generally it is impermissible to shift risks from
60

McMahan, at 376-77. Again, it would not be permissible to throw a grenade at a
lethal attacker surrounded by innocent bystanders.
61
62

Walzer, at 155.

Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin argue that soldiers have a stronger duty to
minimize harm to fellow citizens than to minimize harm to foreign civilians and
conclude that soldiers are morally permitted to minimize harm to fellow citizens by
killing foreign civilians. See Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin, Military Ethics of
Fighting Terror: An Israeli Perspective, 4 JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS 3, 14-15,
18-21 (2005). I will not discuss their argument at length because the intermediate
premises of their argument are highly implausible. For example, they assert that
“[i]t is as morally wrong for the state to let its citizens die [when killing foreign
civilians would prevent their deaths] as it is morally wrong to kill them.” Id. at 20.
However, it seems clear that it is much worse for a state to kill its citizens than to
allow its citizens to be killed, holding the state’s reasons (say, to avoid killing
foreign civilians) constant. Certainly it is much worse for a state to kill its citizens
for no reason than to allow its citizens to be killed to avoid killing foreign civilians.
I will therefore only discuss the less implausible claim that a soldier’s duty to
protect certain civilians offsets the moral asymmetry between killing foreign
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one group of innocent people to another, then it is impermissible to shift
risks from from one group of civilians to another. Moreover, a soldier has
no right to inflict greater harm to protect any civilians than those civilians
have a right to inflict to protect themselves. Since it is impermissible for
one civilian to kill another civilian as a means or as a side-effect of saving
her own life, it is also impermissible for a soldier to kill one civilian as a
means or as a side-effect of saving another civilian.63 Finally, since it is
impermissible to protect any civilians by indirectly causing the death of
other civilians (by using the other civilians as human shields or by hiding
among them) it cannot be permissible to protect any civilians by directly
causing the death of other civilians. It follows that whether mistakenly
sparing a combatant will result in the death of soldiers or the death of
civilians the required level of certainty must always reflect the moral
asymmetry between killing and letting die.
D. LIMITS: INTENTIONAL AND UNINTENTIONAL KILLING
Would a Modified Balancing Approach, that incorporates the
distinction between killing and letting die, provide a moral basis for
targeting in armed conflict? For the sake of convenience, let us assume
that mistakenly killing a civilian is twice as bad as mistakenly allowing a
soldier to die. If a mistakenly spared combatant would kill one soldier,
then soldiers must be moderately certain that an individual is a combatant
before attacking her:
!

P(C|E) > 1/(1 + ) = 1/1.5 = .67
!

To some, 67% certainty that an individual is a combatant may sound like a
reasonable level of certainty to require of soldiers.
However, even on the Modified Balancing Approach, the more
soldiers you might save by killing a combatant the less sure you have to be
that an individual is a combatant rather than a civilian in the first place.
For example, if a mistakenly spared combatant would kill 20 soldiers, then
soldiers may attack an individual who is almost certainly a civilian and not
a combatant:
P(C|E) > 1/(1 +

!"
!

)  = 1/11 = .09

civilians and allowing fellow citizens to be killed. For a more comprehensive
refutation of Kasher and Yadlin’s arguments see McMahan at 346-50.
63

See Haque, Proportionality (in War).
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So, according to even a Modified Balancing Approach, it is permissible to
kill an individual whom one is 90% sure is a civilian if there is a 10%
chance that she is a combatant and that by killing her you will save 20
soldiers. Yet this result seems completely implausible. Why?
If you are almost certain that someone is a civilian then you
presumably believe that she is a civilian; and if you intentionally kill an
individual who is in fact a civilian, believing her to be a civilian, then you
intentionally kill a civilian. Needless to say, intentionally killing a civilian
is the most serious violation of LOAC/IHL, just as intentionally killing a
human being who has done nothing to deserve or make herself liable to be
killed is the most serious of moral wrongs. This wrong is never justifiable,
except perhaps in the most extreme circumstances to prevent far greater
harm to others.64 Certainly, it is not morally justifiable to intentionally kill
a civilian for a 10% chance of saving 20 soldiers.65
Now, we earlier assumed, based on the moral asymmetry between
killing and letting die, that mistakenly killing a civilian is twice as bad as
mistakenly sparing a combatant and thereby allowing a fellow soldier to be
killed. But we have now introduced a second, stronger moral asymmetry,
between intentionally killing civilians and unintentionally killing civilians.
In other words, we earlier assumed that mistakenly killing a civilian is
equivalent to unintentionally killing a civilian. But this need not be the
case. If you intentionally kill someone whom you reasonably but
mistakenly believe is a combatant, then you have unintentionally killed a
civilian. And unintentionally killing a civilian is substantially worse, but
not far worse, than allowing a soldier to be killed. By contrast, if you
intentionally kill someone whom you believe is a civilian, then you have
intentionally killed a civilian. And intentionally killing a civilian is far
worse than allowing a soldier to be killed.
We can put the point a different way: We have been following the
assumption of the Balancing Approach that the required level of certainty is
a function of the relative costs of error. But we now see that the relative
64

Walzer famously holds that attacks on civilian populations could only be
justifiable to prevent a “supreme emergency” involving the destruction of an entire
political community. See WALZER, ch. 16. Presumably, it follows that attacks on
individual civilians are justifiable only to prevent far greater harm to others.
65

Indeed, it is probably impermissible to intentionally kill a civilian to certainly
save 20 soldiers. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U.
L. REV. 249, 253 (1996) (observing that “if the norms of morality prohibit the
action of killing an innocent person, one may not kill an innocent person even if
doing so would prevent twenty innocent people from being killed.”)
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moral costs of error are themselves a function of an actor’s subjective level
of certainty. A soldier’s subjective level of certainty that an individual is a
combatant or a civilian affects whether or not, in the event of a false
positive, she intentionally kills a civilian or unintentionally kills a civilian.
As we have seen, the moral cost of a false positive will be far greater if the
soldier intentionally kills a civilian than if she unintentionally kills a
civilian. Crucially, this difference in the moral cost of a false positive will,
in turn, affect the level of certainty required to permissibly open fire. The
asymmetry between intentionally and unintentionally killing civilians, as
well as the effect of this asymmetry on the required level of certainty, will
be discussed in greater depth in the following part.
III. DEONTOLOGICAL TARGETING
This part develops a normative theory of target verification based
on the very moral asymmetries that the Balancing Approach ignores. This
normative theory, which I call ‘Deontological Targeting’, is developed in
three stages. Section A argues that it is impermissible for a soldier to
intentionally kill an individual whom she believes is a civilian or whom she
believes is probably a civilian. Section B goes further, arguing that it is
unjustifiable and inexcusable for a soldier to intentionally kill an individual
whom she does not reasonably believe is a combatant. Reasonable belief
that an individual is a combatant constitutes a minimum threshold of
certainty that soldiers must reach to permissibly use deadly force. Finally,
Section C argues that, due to the moral asymmetry between killing and
letting die, a soldier may not intentionally kill an individual unless she is
reasonably convinced that the individual is a combatant; is reasonably
certain that the individual poses an immediate threat to a soldier or civilian;
or reasonably believes that the individual poses an immediate threat to a
substantial number of soldiers or civilians. Section D compares
Deontological Targeting with an alternative view proposed by Lt. Col.
Geoffrey Corn.
A. THE INTENTION-BELIEF CONSTRAINT
In the previous part I claimed that the moral and legal constraint on
intentionally killing a civilian is violated when one intentionally kills an
individual, believing her to be a civilian, and she is in fact a civilian.
Importantly, to kill a civilian intentionally one need not kill the civilian
because she is a civilian; it is enough that one believes that she is a
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civilian.66 This understanding of intentional killing is supported by general
principles of criminal law. As Glanville Williams puts it, “[i]ntention is a
state of mind consisting of knowledge of any requisite circumstances plus
desire that any requisite result shall follow from one’s conduct . . . .”67 In
the current context, the requisite result that must be desired is the death of
the individual attacked, while the requisite circumstance the existence of
which must be known is the fact that the individual attacked is a civilian.
Similarly, the Model Penal Code states that “[a] person acts purposely with
respect to a material element of an offense when . . . if the element involves
the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such
circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.”68 Michael Moore
puts the point even more strongly: “The one simple truth is that the law
nowhere requires true purpose with regard to such circumstances.”69 The
same is true in international criminal law.70 On all of these accounts, to
intentionally kill a civilian is to intentionally kill an individual whom one
correctly believes is a civilian.
66

Obviously, some terrorist groups intentionally kill civilians because they are
civilians; others intentionally kill civilians simply because they are vulnerable to
attack and their deaths will spread terror. Similarly, soldiers carrying out a
campaign of genocide may intend to kill individuals because of their race, religion,
ethnicity, or nationality, irrespective of whether they are civilians or opposing
soldiers. Nevertheless, if terrorists or genocidaires intentionally kill individuals
correctly believing them to be civilians then, for both moral and legal purposes,
they intentionally kill those civilians.
67

GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME 20 (1965).

68

Model Penal Code § 2.02(a). See also Model Penal Code § 2.02 commentary at
223 (“Knowledge that the requisite external circumstances exist is a common
element in both [purpose and knowledge].”).
69

Michael S. Moore, Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and Legal
Punishability, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 179, 187 (R.A.
Duff and Stuart P. Green eds., 2011). See also id. (“This is certainly true of
general intent crimes such as rape: the actor need only know that the woman is not
consenting, he need not be motivated by that fact (wanting only forced sex, for
example). But this is even true of specific intent crimes such as assault with intent
to rape.”).
70

See, e.g., Mohamed Elewa Badar, The Mental Element in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: A Commentary from a Comparative Criminal Law
Perspective, 19 CRIMINAL LAW FORUM 473, 496 (2008) (“Logically speaking,
there is no offence which requires the prosecution to prove that the accused, in the
true sense, intends a particular circumstance to exist at the time he carries out his
conduct.”)
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The structure of intentional killing provides moral and legal
support for A.P.V. Rogers’s otherwise undefended assertion that “[a]t the
very least, customary law would require those responsible for attacks not to
attack persons or objects which they know or believe to be civilian.”71
Customary law clearly prohibits intentionally attacking civilians, and
intentionally attacking civilians just is intentionally attacking individuals
whom one knows or believes are civilians.
The prohibition on intentionally killing individuals whom one
believes are civilians provides an outer limit to the Balancing Approach:
one may not kill an individual whom one believes is a civilian even if there
is some chance that she is a combatant and that sparing her will result in
harm to one’s forces or mission. However, this outer limit remains far too
weak: the prohibition would not apply to a soldier who ‘shoots first and
asks questions later’ by attacking an individual without forming either a
belief that she is a civilian or a belief that she is a combatant. Such a
soldier necessarily violates her legal obligation to distinguish civilians from
combatants. At a minimum, distinguishing civilians from combatants
requires deciding, judging, determining, or concluding who is a civilian and
who is a combatant. In addition, soldiers are legally required to exercise
‘constant care’ to spare civilians72 and are morally required both not to try
to kill civilians and to try not to kill civilians.73 At a minimum, constant
care to spare civilians and trying not to kill civilians requires deciding who
is a civilian and who is a combatant. In ordinary life you are often morally
permitted to withhold judgment in the face of uncertainty. But if the
question is whether the individual you intend to kill is a civilian or a
combatant, you are not allowed to keep an open mind.
What moral and legal concepts best capture the culpability of the
soldier who intentionally kills an individual without forming any
affirmative belief regarding that individual’s liability to be killed? It is
tempting to say that such a soldier acts recklessly with respect to whether
the individual attacked is a civilian or a combatant. However, the concept
of recklessness will not advance our understanding. Recklessness
generally involves the unjustified creation of a substantial risk; to find an
actor reckless we must compare the risk she creates with her reasons for
taking that risk. In the current context, a finding of recklessness would
involve comparing the risk of mistakenly killing a civilian with the risk of
71

Rogers, at 176.

72

Id.

73

See WALZER, supra note 80, at 155-56 (proposing a principle of “double
intention”).
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mistakenly sparing a combatant. In other words, a recklessness inquiry
would lead us back to the Balancing Approach we have already rejected.
Even a recklessness inquiry that reflects the moral asymmetry between
killing and letting die would still entail that it is permissible to intentionally
kill an individual who is almost certainly a civilian if doing so might (but
almost certainly will not) prevent a substantially greater (but not far
greater) number of soldiers from being killed. If that implication still
seems implausible then the concept of recklessness cannot lead us forward.
Alternatively, we could regard the soldier who attacks individuals
without forming any belief regarding their legal status as morally
equivalent to a soldier who attacks individuals believing that they are
civilians. This approach finds some support in modern criminal law.
According to the Model Penal Code, “when knowledge of the existence of
a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established
if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually
believes that it does not exist.”74 The drafters of the Model Penal Code
believed that their understanding of knowledge ‘‘deals with the situation
that British commentators have denominated ‘wilful blindness’ or
‘connivance,’ the case of the actor who is aware of the probable existence
of a material fact but does not determine whether it exists or does not
exist.”75 Following this approach, we would regard a soldier who is aware
of a high probability that an individual is a civilian, and who does not
affirmatively believe that the individual is a combatant, as morally
equivalent to a soldier who affirmatively believes that the individual is a
civilian. If the willfully blind soldier intentionally kills an individual, and
the individual is in fact a civilian, then the willfully blind soldier is
regarded as having intentionally killed a civilian.
Taken to an extreme, the asserted moral equivalence of willful
blindness and affirmative belief can erode the distinction between
knowledge and recklessness. If you believe that there is a low probability
that a fact exists, but form no affirmative belief one way or the other, then
it seems unfair to regard you as if you affirmatively believe that fact exists.
However, if we take the requirement of a ‘high probability’ seriously, the
asserted moral equivalence seems sound. Specifically, a belief that a fact
probably, or more likely than not, exists, absent an affirmative belief that
the fact does not exist, seems morally equivalent to an affirmative belief
that the fact exists. At first glance, when an individual withholds judgment
74

Model Penal Code § 2.02(7).

75

Model Penal Code § 2.02 commentary at 248.
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regarding a particular fact, we may feel that she could just as easily
conclude that the fact does exist or that the fact does not exist. If her
culpability would be significantly less if she were to conclude that the fact
does not exist (in which case she might be reckless regarding that fact but
would not know that the fact exists), then we may feel that we ought to
give her the benefit of the doubt and treat her as if she had the lower level
of culpability. We essentially give her moral credit for the less culpable
mental state that she could have formed but did not. But this grant of moral
credit would be inappropriate if she estimates that the fact probably does
exist, because in that case it would be irrational for her to conclude that it
does not exist. It would be irrational for her to think “A is probably x, but A
is not x.” Specifically, it would be irrational to estimate that someone is
probably, or more likely than not, a civilian but nevertheless form an
affirmative belief that she is a combatant. Withholding judgment should
not mitigate one’s blameworthiness when one is rationally restrained from
forming the less culpable judgment. In such cases, withholding judgment
is morally comparable to forming the more culpable judgment, which is the
only judgment one could rationally form.
We have therefore identified two plausible constraints on the
Balancing Approach: a soldier may not intentionally kill an individual
whom the soldier either (i) believes is a civilian or (ii) believes is probably
a civilian and does not affirmatively believe is a combatant. However,
these constraints remain too subjective and too weak: they permit soldiers
to intentionally kill individuals whom they unreasonably believe are
probably combatants, or whose probable status they have not even bothered
to estimate. The following section proposes a stronger, objective threshold
of certainty that soldiers must achieve before using lethal force.
B. THE REASONABLE BELIEF THRESHOLD
In the preceding section we saw that soldiers may not intentionally
kill individuals whom they subjectively believe are or probably are
civilians. The goal of this section is to show that soldiers may not
intentionally kill individuals unless the soldiers reasonably believe those
individuals are combatants.
The reasonable belief threshold already has some basis in state
practice and international court judgments. For example, the US Naval
Handbook states that “[c]ombatants in the field must make an honest
determination as to whether a particular civilian is or is not subject to
deliberate attack based on the person’s behavior, location and attire, and
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other information available at the time.”76 In other words, soldiers may not
intentionally kill individuals unless they sincerely believe those individuals
are combatants. This principle precludes soldiers from attacking without
first forming an affirmative belief that an individual is a combatant.
Unfortunately, the ‘honest determination’ standard permits a soldier to
attack based on an unreasonable belief that an individual is a combatant.
This standard is an improvement over the standards discussed in the
previous section, but is also too subjective.
The correct position was elegantly expressed by the Trial Chamber
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
when it wrote that “a person shall not be made the object of attack when it
is not reasonable to believe, in the circumstances of the person
contemplating the attack, including the information available to the latter,
that the potential target is a combatant.”77 This principle precludes soldiers
from attacking unless they both sincerely and reasonably believe that the
individual attacked is a combatant. Unfortunately, the Trial Chamber did
not explain the moral or legal basis for its statement and its actual holding
was more limited.78 Indeed, it appears that the Trial Chamber’s statement
has been almost entirely ignored by courts, commentators, and scholars.79
The argument of this section provides moral support for the Trial
Chamber’s legal claim.
At the most fundamental moral level, what makes the intentional
killing of a civilian presumptively morally wrong is not that she is a
civilian but that she is a human being. The fact that an individual is a
civilian does not give her any more rights or additional moral protection
76

United States, Naval Handbook § 830.
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Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment of Trial Chamber
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec.5, 2003), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf.
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The Trial Chamber held that it is a war crime to recklessly attack civilians. See
id. para. 54. However, as we have seen in the previous section, a recklessness
threshold replicates the very Balancing Approach we earlier rejected.
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Searches of Westlaw and Google indicate that the Trial Chamber’s statement has
never been cited by another judge or examined by a single scholar, and has been
quoted (without discussion) in only two sources. See JENNIFER TRAHAN (HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH), GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITy 125
(2006); ICRC, Customary IHL Database, http://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule1_SectionC; id. at http://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule6; id. at http://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule6_sectiond.
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than she would otherwise enjoy simply in virtue of being human.80 Indeed,
the crime of murder just is the intentional killing of another human being.
It follows that, from a moral perspective, it is the intentional killing of
another human being that a soldier needs to be able to either justify or
excuse.
What might justify a soldier in intentionally killing another human
being? Among other things, the fact that a human being is a combatant
might justify intentionally killing her, because by becoming a combatant
she may forfeit her moral right not to be intentionally killed and make
herself morally liable to be intentionally killed.81 So international law, and
much of just war theory, has it exactly wrong: the fact that someone is a
civilian is not a wrong-making feature of intentionally killing her; the fact
that she is a human being is sufficient to make it presumptively wrong to
intentionally kill her. Instead, the fact that someone is a combatant is a
wrong-justifying feature of intentionally killing her; by becoming a
combatant she makes herself liable to be killed.82 It follows that it is not
only unjustifiable to intentionally kill an individual whom you honestly
(and correctly) believe is a civilian; it is also unjustifiable to intentionally
kill an individual whom you do not reasonably (and correctly) believe is a
combatant.
80

Cf. WALZER, 145 (“[T]he theoretical problem is not to describe how immunity
[to intentional killing] is gained, but how it is lost. We are all immune to start with;
our right not to be attacked is a feature of normal human relationships.”)
81

The moral basis of liability to intentional killing in armed conflict remains the
subject of profound philosophical disagreement. See, e.g., WALZER (arguing that
all combatants are liable to be killed because they pose a threat to opposing
combatants and civilians); JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR (2009) (arguing that
only combatants who fight for an unjust cause are liable to be killed because they
are responsible for an unjust threat to opposing combatants and civilians; in
principle, civilians and prisoners who share responsibility for an unjust threat are
also liable to be killed). For my own view see Haque, Criminal Law and Morality
at War, at 495-96 (arguing that combatants fighting for a just cause may defend
themselves from opposing combatants who forcibly resist their achievement of
their just cause; civilians and prisoners are never liable to be killed). However, our
topic is sufficiently narrow to avoid most points of controversy. We are designing
rules for soldiers who presumably believe that they fight for a just cause and who
must decide whether to intentionally kill an individual who may pose or decisively
contribute to a lethal threat to them or their fellow soldiers. The proposed rules
will remain sound on any plausible account of the moral basis of liability to
intentional killing in armed conflict.
82

For further discussion see Haque, Criminal Law and Morality at War.
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But what if you intentionally kill a human being whom, it turns
out, is not a combatant but instead a civilian who retains her ordinary right
not to be intentionally killed? You are not justified in killing her because
she is not in fact a combatant. However, you may be excused in killing her
if you reasonably believe that she is a combatant. If you reasonably but
mistakenly believe that a justifying circumstance exists then your belief
does not justify your action but generally it will excuse your action.
Indeed, “the paradigm excuse is that one had a justified belief in
justification.”83 Your reasonable mistake does not make what you did
morally desirable, but generally it does render you moral blameless. So, if
you intentionally kill another human being then you have committed a
presumptive moral wrong that you must either justify or excuse. If you act
on the true belief that she is a combatant, then you may be justified; if you
act on the reasonable but mistaken belief that she is a combatant, then you
may be excused. Alternatively, we can say that action based on a
reasonable belief in a justifying circumstance is permissible relative to the
evidence even if it proves impermissible relative to the facts.84
What, then, is a reasonable belief? In general, a reasonable belief
is a justified belief; a justified belief is a belief supported by undefeated
reasons; and reasons are undefeated if they are at least as strong as any
opposing reasons.85 It follows that a belief that a justifying circumstance
exists is reasonable just in case the reasons to believe that circumstance
exists are at least as strong as the reasons to believe that circumstance does
83

John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, Reasons, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 444 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro
eds. 2000) (“The contrast here is between having reasons for action and having
reasons to believe that one has reasons for action. It corresponds to the distinction,
well known to all lawyers, between justifications and excuses. One justifies one’s
actions by reference to the reasons one had for acting. One’s actions are excused
in terms of the reasons one had for believing that one had reasons for action.”).
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See DEREK PARFIT, 1 ON WHAT MATTERS 150-51 (2011) (“Some act of ours
would be wrong in the fact-relative sense just when this act would be wrong in the
ordinary sense if we knew all the relevant facts, . . . and wrong in the evidencerelative sense just when this act would be wrong in the ordinary sense if we
believed what the available evidence gives us decisive reasons to believe, and
these beliefs were true.” ).
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See, e.g., JOHN GARDNER, OFFENCES AND DEFENCES 110 (2007) (“One must
have an undefeated reason for one’s belief, and that moreover must be the reason
why one holds the belief.”)
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not exist.86 Conversely, a belief that a justifying circumstance exists is
unreasonable if the reasons to believe that circumstance exists are
outweighed by the reasons to believe that circumstance does not exist. We
can express the same idea by saying that it is unreasonable to believe that a
justifying circumstance exists if you have reason to believe that the
circumstance probably does not exist, or if you have most or strongest
reasons to believe that the circumstance does not exist. We can also see
why generally we excuse actions based on reasonable but mistaken beliefs:
although the actions are unjustified, the actions are based on beliefs that are
justified, and generally we should not blame others for acting on the basis
of justified beliefs. Human beings have no choice but to act on the basis of
beliefs that may prove false; if we act only on the basis of justified beliefs
then generally we have done all that morality can reasonably demand.
The defender of the Balancing Approach might nonetheless ask:
Why isn’t it reasonable, and therefore excusable, to intentionally kill
another human being, even if she is probably not a combatant, provided the
number of lives you might save are substantially greater (though not far
greater) than the number of lives you would take?
The most straightforward response draws on the Kantian idea that
generally it is impermissible to treat a person as a mere means to an end. In
my view, to harm a person as a means is to harm her in order to bring about
some desired result or consequence. To harm someone as a mere means is
to harm her as a means when she has done nothing to make herself liable to
be harmed as a means, for in that case you cannot justify harming her by
reference to her own voluntary actions. Finally, to treat someone as a mere
means is to harm her as a means when you do not reasonably believe that
she is liable to be harmed as a means. If I intentionally harm one person to
prevent harm to others then I harm the first person as a means. However, if
I reasonably believe that she is liable to be harmed then I do not treat her as
a mere means. By contrast, if I do not reasonably believe that she is liable
to be harmed then by harming her to prevent harm to others I
impermissibly treat her as a mere means.
If the reasonable belief threshold is a general feature of moral
justification and excuse, then soldiers can justify or excuse the intentional
killing of another human being only if they act on an affirmative and
reasonable belief that the individual killed is a combatant. It follows that
86

See R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME 267-68 (2007) (“A belief is justified if
there are good reasons for accepting it, reasons at least as good as those for
rejecting it; it is unjustified if there are no, or insufficient, reasons for accepting
it”).
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their reasons to believe that the individual is a combatant must be at least as
strong as their reasons to believe that the individual is a civilian. Put
another way, soldiers cannot reasonably believe that an individual is a
combatant if they have reason to believe that she is probably a civilian or
have most or strongest reason to believe that she is a civilian. The
reasonable belief threshold therefore rejects the counterintuitive
implications of the Balancing Approach discussed in Part II on the basis of
a general moral theory of justified and excused action.
Importantly, a well-trained soldier can form and act on reasonable
beliefs rapidly and reliably under pressure.87 Military training already aims
to sharpen situational awareness and streamline information processing so
that soldiers immediately pick out relevant features of their surroundings
and swiftly form judgments regarding their tactical situation. No doubt,
some soldiers will panic under fire and shoot anything that moves.
However, we must not lower our moral, legal, and professional standards to
accommodate soldiers overwhelmed by their circumstances; rather we must
properly train soldiers to rise and meet otherwise justified standards even in
the most difficult circumstances. In addition, political leaders and military
commanders should not place soldiers in tactical situations in which
meeting justified standards will prove too much for too many of even the
best-trained soldiers.
***
The preceding moral argument for the reasonable belief threshold
is supported by general principles of criminal law.88 However, three
aspects of the criminal law governing justification and excuse warrant brief
discussion. First, leading criminal law scholars agree that a reasonable
87

It may be worth noting that a soldier need not think to herself ‘I believe that
individual is a combatant for the following reasons . . .’ in order to believe that
individual is a combatant for those reasons. Reasonable belief does not require an
internal monologue.
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See, e.g., Wayne LaFave, 2 Subst. Crim. L. § 10.4 (2d ed.) (concluding that “the
case law and statutory law on self-defense generally require that the defendant's
belief in the necessity of using force to prevent harm to himself be a reasonable
one, so that one who honestly though unreasonably believes in the necessity of
using force in self-protection loses the defense.”); id. (“There is a little authority
that an honest [but unreasonable ] belief in the necessity of self-defense will do . . .
. Only a few of the modern codes have adopted this position.”). Similarly, a
Canadian defendant pleading self-defense must believe, “on reasonable grounds,
that he cannot otherwise preserve himself from death or grievous bodily harm.”
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 34(2) (1985) (Can.).
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belief that a justifying circumstance exists provides a justification only if
the belief is true but only an excuse if the belief is false.89 However, many
jurisdictions do not systematically distinguish between justifications and
excuses.90 As a result, many jurisdictions regard a defendant who
reasonably but mistakenly believes that a justifying circumstance exists as
justified rather than excused. For our purposes, what is important is that,
under either approach, an actor must reasonably believe that the justifying
circumstance exists in order to escape moral blame and criminal liability.
Second, in most jurisdictions, a defendant who intentionally kills
another person, whom she believes is liable to be killed, may be convicted
of nothing if her belief is reasonable and but may be convicted of murder if
her belief is unreasonable.91 In other jurisdictions, a defendant who kills in
the unreasonable belief that the individual killed posed a lethal threat will
be granted a partial or ‘imperfect’ defense and will only be liable for
second degree murder or manslaughter.92 For our purposes, what is crucial
89

See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 762–69 (1978);
JOHN GARDNER, OFFENCES AND DEFENCES 110 (2007) (“Thus the most basic or
rudimentary case of non-technical excuse remains that of unjustified action upon
justified belief.”); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a
Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 266, 271–73, 283–84
(1975).
90

Indeed, the Model Penal Code does not even recognize excuses as a distinct
category of affirmative defenses, preferring to lump duress (an excuse) with
complicity (a mode of responsibility) and entrapment (a bar to prosecution) under
the capacious heading of General Principles of Liability. See MPC art. 2. See also
Wayne LaFave, 2 Subst. Crim. L. § 9.1 (2d ed.) (discussing the MPC approach and
concluding that “[i]n those instances in which the defendant is mistaken in his
belief, what is called a justification would seem more properly characterized as an
excuse”).
91

See, e.g., LaFave, § 10.4 (2d ed.); People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 506 N.Y.S.2d
18, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y.1986) (observing that this approach “provide[s] either a
complete defense or no defense at all to a defendant charged with any crime
involving the use of deadly force.”).
92

See, e.g., Illinois Criminal Code § 9–2 (second degree murder); Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes § 2503(b) (voluntary manslaughter); In re Christian S., 7
Cal.4th 768, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574 (1994) (voluntary manslaughter).
Similarly, under the Model Penal Code a defendant who kills in the mistaken belief
that the individual killed posed a lethal threat will be liable for murder if that belief
was formed due to extreme recklessness; manslaughter if that belief was formed
due to ordinary recklessness; and negligent homicide if that belief was formed due
to criminal negligence. See MPC §3.09.
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is that a defendant must affirmatively and reasonably believe that the
justifying circumstance exists to escape moral blame and criminal liability.
Finally, the reasonable belief threshold applies to ordinary
individuals and government agents alike. For example, law enforcement
officers are justified or excused in using deadly force only if they
reasonably believe that a justifying circumstance exists: for example, that
such force is necessary to defend themselves or others or to prevent the
escape of certain dangerous suspects.93 Similarly, under the European
Convention on Human Rights, “the use of force by agents of the State . . .
may be justified . . . where it is based on an honest belief which is
perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time but which subsequently
turns out to be mistaken.” 94 Finally, in the United States a police officer
acts unconstitutionally by using deadly force absent a reasonable belief that
a fleeing suspect poses a threat to public safety.95
93

See, e.g., New York Penal Law 35.30(1); Cal. Penal Code § 835a. Similarly,
under the Model Penal Code, a law enforcement officer will be held criminally
liable for using deadly force based on a recklessly or negligently formed belief that
the relevant justifying circumstances exist. See MPC 3.07 & 3.09(2). Cf.
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., Standards for
Law Enforcement Agencies 1-2 (1983) (italics deleted) (concluding that police
departments must restrict the use of deadly force to situations in which “the officer
reasonably believes that the action is in defense of human life . . . or in defense of
any person in immediate danger of serious physical injury.”).
94

McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 ECHR 97 GC, para. 200. See also id. para. 134
(“The relevant domestic case-law establishes that the reasonableness of the use of
force has to be decided on the basis of the facts which the user of the force
honestly believed to exist: this involves the subjective test as to what the user
believed and an objective test as to whether he had reasonable grounds for that
belief.”) (citing Lynch v. Ministry of Defence [1983] Northern Ireland Law
Reports 216; R v. Gladstone Williams [1983] 78 Criminal Appeal Reports 276,
281; and R v. Thain [1985] Northern Ireland Law Reports 457, 462).
95

See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, at 21 (1984) (finding that police officer
“could not reasonably have believed that [the suspect]—young, slight, and
unarmed—posed any threat.”). See also Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 969 (2008).
(“Sincerely held but unreasonable belief does not justify the use of force under
Garner, Graham, or our own precedents.”) Although U.S. courts often use the
phrase “probable cause” to describe the level of certainty required by the U.S.
Constitution, courts have uniformly held that, when it comes to the use of deadly
force, probable cause and reasonable belief are equivalent requirements. See, e.g.,
___. Certainly there is no indication that the U.S. Constitution permits police to
intentionally kill fleeing suspects whom they do not reasonably believe pose a
threat to the public.
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C. ABOVE THE THRESHOLD
Are soldiers who satisfy the minimum threshold and reasonably
believe that an individual is a combatant free to fire at will? They are not.
Since a soldier’s reasons not to kill civilians are substantially stronger than
her reasons to kill combatants, her reasons to believe that an individual is a
combatant must be equally substantially (or proportionately) stronger than
her reasons to believe that the individual is a civilian. Put another way,
since killing a civilian generally is substantially worse than allowing a
soldier to be killed, it is impermissible to intentionally kill an individual
unless the expected harm (that is, the possible harm discounted by its
probability) of mistakenly sparing her is equally substantially (or
proportionately) greater than the expected harm of mistakenly killing her.
For example, imagine that you are remotely operating a UAV and
see several armed men on your monitor. The men’s weapons, age, dress,
and movements provide you with strong reasons to believe that they are
insurgents. However, demographic and cultural patterns provide you with
strong reasons to believe that the men are civilians armed and organized to
defend themselves and their community from insurgent attacks. Suppose
that, even if the men are combatants, they pose no immediate threat to
anyone and it is highly unlikely that they will kill a substantial number of
soldiers or civilians before being captured or killed in a future engagement.
In such a scenario, it would be wrong to kill the men even if your reasons
to believe that they are opposing combatants are as strong or slightly
stronger than your reasons to believe that they are civilians.
What, then, should you do? If possible, you should track the men’s
movements and kill them only if new information provides you with
conclusive reason to believe they are combatants; with much stronger
reason to believe that they pose an immediate threat to a comparable
number of soldiers or civilians than to believe that they pose no such threat;
or with most reason to believe that they pose an immediate threat to a
substantially greater number of soldiers or civilians. Put another way, you
should only kill the men if you are reasonably convinced that they are
combatants; if you are reasonably certain that they are about to attack a
comparable number of soldiers or civilians; or if you reasonably believe
that they are about to attack a substantially greater number of soldiers or
civilians. However, if such time and resources cannot be spared to obtain
additional information and reduce the risk of mistakenly killing civilians,
then you must disengage and accept the risk of mistakenly sparing
combatants.

2012]

KILLING IN THE FOG OF WAR

43

So, although a reasonable belief that an individual is a combatant is
always necessary to excuse intentionally killing her, it is often not
sufficient. As the relative costs of a false negative decrease, one’s level of
certainty must increase. In other words, above the reasonable belief
threshold the Modified Balancing Approach seems plausible: the required
level of certainty should vary with the relative costs of error, adjusted to
reflect the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die. It is only
below the reasonable belief threshold that even the Modified Balancing
Approach loses its plausibility.
If we embrace Deontological Targeting and reject the Balancing
Approach, must we accept that it is never permissible for a soldier to
intentionally kill an individual who is probably a civilian (that is, whom the
soldier has strong reasons to believe is a combatant but stronger reasons to
believe is a civilian)? Not necessarily. So-called ‘threshold deontologists’
generally believe that it is permissible to intentionally kill an innocent
person in extreme circumstances to prevent far greater harm to others.
These threshold deontologists may also accept that it is permissible to
intentionally kill an innocent person to prevent far greater expected harm to
others (that is, the harm that killing her might prevent discounted by the
likelihood that killing her will prevent that harm). In other words, if it is
permissible to intentionally kill an innocent person if the number of
innocent people this would save exceeds some numerical threshold then it
may be permissible to kill an innocent person if the expected number of
innocent people this would save (that is, the number of innocent people this
might save discounted by the likelihood that this would save them) exceeds
the same numerical threshold. It might therefore be permissible for a
soldier to intentionally kill an individual who is probably a civilian to
prevent far greater expected harm to others (that is, the harm killing her
would prevent if she turns out to be a combatant discounted by the
likelihood that she is a combatant). However, since it is hardly ever the
case that intentionally killing an individual who is probably a civilian will
prevent far greater expected harm to others, the reasonable belief threshold
is, for all practical purposes, absolute.
Significantly, Deontological Targeting entails that there may be
cases in which it would be permissible to intentionally kill an individual
whom one reasonably believes is a combatant to prevent substantially (but
not far) greater harm to others but impermissible to intentionally kill an
individual whom one has strong but not decisive reason to believe is a
combatant to prevent substantially greater harm to others. For example,
suppose you receive reliable human and signals intelligence that a specific
insurgent will open fire with a concealed firearm at a specific time and
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location. At that time and location, you see an individual whose facial and
physical appearance closely matches that of the insurgent and whose
clothing and behavior is strongly corroborative of an intended attack.
Under such circumstances, if non-lethal options are not available, it may be
permissible to attack the individual, even if such an attack would
unintentionally kill two nearby civilians, to prevent substantially greater
harm to others. However, if you see three individuals who closely
resemble the insurgent then even if you reasonably believe that one of them
is the insurgent you cannot reasonably believe that each of them is the
insurgent. Under these circumstances, it would be impermissible to attack
each individual unless doing so would prevent far greater harm to others
even though in both cases you would kill one combatant and two civilians.
This implication of Deontological Targeting may seem paradoxical
but it should not. By definition, every nonconsequentialist moral view
holds that it is sometimes permissible to bring about good outcomes in one
way but not in another way. If the distinctions between intentionally and
unintentionally killing civilians and between reasonable and unreasonable
belief in justifying circumstances are morally significant then this
necessarily entails that we are sometimes permitted to unintentionally kill
civilians as a side-effect but not to intentionally kill individuals as a means
whom we do not reasonably believe are combatants.
D. AN ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERED
In a forthcoming article, Lt. Col. Geoffrey Corn proposes that a
soldier may intentionally kill an individual if the soldier either (a)
reasonably suspects that the individual is a member of an opposing regular
armed force or (b) believes based on a preponderance of the evidence that
the individual is a civilian directly participating in hostilities.96 While I
respect Corn’s military experience and appreciate the thought he has
devoted to this difficult topic, I find his proposal very difficult to accept.
For one thing, it is not clear why the required level of certainty that an
individual is liable to attack should vary with the different possible bases of
liability to attack (membership in an armed force, direct participation in
hostilities, and so forth). Of course, it generally will prove easier to satisfy
the required level of certainty while fighting a regular armed force than
while fighting an irregular armed group, since relevant information will be
96

See Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Command Judgment, and a Proposed
Quantum of Proof Component: A Fourth Amendment Lesson in Contextual
Reasonableness, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV. __ (2012).
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more accessible and less ambiguous. But the required level of certainty
should remain the same.
On my view, a soldier may not intentionally kill another human
being unless the soldier reasonably believes that human being is a member
of a regular armed force, a civilian directly participating in hostilities, or
otherwise liable to attack. Reasonable suspicion is not enough. If you have
reason to suspect that an individual is liable to attack then you should
investigate further. But if your reasons to conclude that an individual is
liable to attack are outweighed by your reasons to conclude that she is not
liable to attack then you are neither justified nor excused in attacking her.
The reasonable belief threshold I defend may seem quite close to
the preponderance of the evidence standard Corn applies to civilians
directly participating in hostilities. However, while the moral basis of the
reasonable belief threshold lies in a general theory of justification and
excuse, the moral basis of Corn’s proposal remains unclear. For example,
Corn writes that nothing less than a preponderance of the evidence can
rebut the presumption that civilians are illegitimate targets. However, the
law is full of presumptions that can be rebutted by more or less than a
preponderance of the evidence.97 Indeed, Corn himself writes that the
presumption that civilian objects are not liable to attack can be rebutted by
something less than a preponderance of the evidence, namely probable
cause (which Corn defines as a ‘fair probability’) to believe that a civilian
object has been converted into a military objective by its nature, purpose,
location, or use.98 More generally, when we say that a soldier may not
attack a civilian unless and for such time as that civilian directly
participates in hostilities, we are not asserting an evidentiary presumption
and describing the evidence that would rebut that presumption; rather, we
are asserting a substantive rule and describing a substantive exception to
that rule. The pressing question is how certain the soldier must be that the
substantive exception applies in a particular case before attacking a
particular civilian. The key to answering this pressing question lies not in
the evidentiary concepts of presumption and rebuttal, as Corn suggests, but
in the moral concepts of justification and excuse, as I have argued.
97

For example, in a criminal trial, the presumption of innocence can be rebutted
only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
98

Corn writes that probable cause that a civilian is directly participating in
hostilities is not sufficient to warrant intentionally killing that civilian because it
“fails to exclude alternate probabilities—it merely creates one among several.” Id.
at [43]. However, preponderance of the evidence does not exclude alternate
possibilities either—it merely identifies one as more probable than the others.

2012]

KILLING IN THE FOG OF WAR

46

Finally, Corn makes no attempt to explain how the required level
of certainty varies above the minimum thresholds he proposes, saying only
that “a more demanding quantum may evolve over time as a matter of
operational practice.”99 This is a serious limitation, since it would be
wrong to intentionally kill a human being (who turns out to be a civilian)
based on a bare preponderance of the evidence that she is a combatant if
the costs of mistakenly sparing her (if she turned out to be a combatant) are
very low. For example, if an individual poses no immediate threat to
anyone then it would be wrong to kill that individual if it is only slightly
more probable that the individual is a combatant than that she is a civilian.
As I have argued, reasonable belief sets a minimum threshold of certainty
that soldiers must achieve before attacking any individual. Moreover,
above the minimum threshold of reasonable belief the required level of
certainty reflects both the relative costs of error and the moral asymmetry
between killing and letting die.
IV. DEONTOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY
This article began with two questions: First, how sure must
soldiers be that an individual is a combatant rather than a civilian before
attacking her? Second, how much risk to herself, her unit, or her mission
must a soldier accept in order to reduce the risk of mistakenly killing a
civilian? This part argues that the second question should be answered by
reference to the first. Specifically, soldiers must accept any personal or
operational risks necessary to achieve the required level of certainty. If
soldiers are unable to reach the required level of certainty, or if they are
unwilling to accept the risks necessary to do so, then they must hold their
fire, even if that forbearance will leave them at greater risk.
The position that soldiers must take all necessary risks to reach the
required level of certainty may seem demanding, but it follows logically
from the discussion so far. The required level of certainty already takes
into account the cost of attack (that one might kill a civilian) and the cost of
restraint (that one might spare a combatant who may kill one or more
fellow soldiers). If the required level of certainty is higher than the
minimum threshold of reasonable belief then this means that the cost of
restraint is less than the cost of attack. If the cost of verification (that one
might come under attack while seeking additional information) is greater
than the cost of restraint, then the soldiers may choose the less costly
option and hold their fire. If the cost of verification is less than the cost of
99

Id. at [44-45].

2012]

KILLING IN THE FOG OF WAR

47

restraint, then the cost of verification must also be less than the cost of
attack. Either way, the cost of verification cannot justify attack when the
required level of certainty has not been reached.100
Importantly, it is the responsibility of military planners to train and
equip their soldiers to verify the legitimacy of their targets in the safest way
possible. Tactical and technological innovation can substantially reduce,
though never eliminate, the risks involved in distinguishing civilians from
combatants. Undeniably, soldiers facing a non-uniformed enemy force will
often find that reaching the required level of certainty will require
accepting serious risks that they or their fellow soldiers will be killed. In
individual cases, accepting such risks will require soldiers to display
tremendous moral integrity and psychological fortitude. Over the length of
an irregular conflict, accepting such risks will mean that a significant
number of soldiers will be killed while attempting to verify the legitimacy
of their targets. The moral and strategic implications of such losses are
obvious. However, armed forces must not reduce or avoid such losses by
inflicting comparable losses on the civilian population. Instead, military
commanders must train and equip their forces to reduce the risks of
verification; prepare their forces to accept any remaining risks of
verification; and, whenever possible, avoid placing their forces in situations
in which the risks of verification are individually too difficult to bear or
collectively too difficult to sustain. As General David Petraeus observes,
“to be brutally frank about it, if your overriding objective is to protect your
own force, then you probably should not have deployed in the first place,
because the only way to avoid risk to your forces is not to get involved.101
100

Rogers reaches a similar conclusion regarding air attacks on ground targets:
If [an aircrew’s] assessment is that (a) the risk to them
of getting close enough to the target to identify it
properly is too high, (b) that there is a real danger of
incidental death, injury or damage to civilians or
civilian objects because of lack of verification of the
target, and (c) they or friendly forces are not in
immediate danger if the attack is not carried out, there is
no need for them to put themselves at risk to verify the
target. Quite simply, the attack should not be carried
out.

Rogers, at 179.
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Interview with Gen. David Petraeus, FRONTLINE: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, PBS
(Feb. 19, 2008),
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In addition to their specific obligation to take all necessary risks to
achieve the required level of certainty, soldiers have a general obligation to
take additional risks to obtain additional information regarding potential
targets. Soldiers who seek additional information regarding potential
targets often increase the risk that they will be killed, while soldiers who do
not seek such additional information often increase the risk that they will
kill civilians. As we saw in section I.C, according to the Balancing
Approach, a precaution is feasible just in case the humanitarian
considerations in favor of taking the precaution outweigh the military
considerations against taking the precaution; a precaution is infeasible just
in case the military considerations against taking the precaution outweigh
the humanitarian considerations in favor of taking the precaution. This
suggests that soldiers need not seek additional information regarding
potential targets if seeking that additional information would increase the
risk to soldiers even slightly more than obtaining that additional
information would decrease the risk to civilians.
However, as we saw in section II.C, generally it is substantially
worse for soldiers to kill a civilian than to allow a fellow soldier to be
killed. It follows that generally it is substantially worse for a soldier to
increase the risk that she may kill a civilian than to increase the risk that
she may allow a fellow soldier to be killed. Therefore, a soldier must seek
additional information regarding potential targets unless seeking that
additional information would increase the risk to soldiers substantially
more than obtaining that additional information would decrease the risk to
civilians. For example, if killing a civilian is at least twice as bad as
allowing a soldier to be killed then soldiers must seek additional
information regarding the legitimacy of their targets unless seeking
additional information would increase the risk that soldiers will be killed at
least twice as much as obtaining additional information would decrease the
risk that the soldiers will kill civilians.
Importantly, the two obligations described above—the specific
obligation to take all necessary risks to achieve the required level of
certainty, and the general obligation to take additional risks to obtain
additional information regarding potential targets—are distinct and operate
independently of one another. The specific obligation reflects the relative
costs of attack and costs of restraint, while the general obligation reflects
the relative risks of attack and risks of verification. The risks of
verification can never justify attacking without the required level of
certainty for the reasons described at the beginning of this section. The
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/haditha/interviews/petraeus.html#ixzz1e
Nb9b3CK.
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risks of verification can justify failing to obtain information that would
further reduce the risk of attack to civilians, but only if seeking that
information would further increase the risk to soldiers to a substantially
greater degree. Put the other way around, soldiers are obligated to further
reduce the risks of attack if they can do so without a substantially greater
further increase to the risks of verification.
The general obligation described above is inspired by an important
recent proposal by David Luban.102 Luban argues that soldiers must use
more discriminating tactics (such as engaging with opposing forces in close
combat) rather than less discriminating tactics (such as engaging with
opposing forces from afar using artillery and air power) unless using the
more discriminating tactics would increase the marginal risk to soldiers
substantially more than using the less discriminating tactics would reduce
the marginal risk to civilians.103
My proposal differs from Luban’s in at least two ways. First, my
proposal is concerned with determining whether an individual is liable to
attack (distinction), while Luban’s proposal is mostly concerned with
determining how to attack individuals who are liable to attack
(discrimination). However, this difference is not dispositive, because both
my proposal and Luban’s can be generalized to apply to all precautions in
attack: soldiers should take additional precautions to avoid harming
civilians unless taking these precautions would increase the marginal risk
to soldiers substantially more than taking these precautions would decrease
the marginal risk to civilians.104 This general principle should guide both
target verification and selecting means and methods of attack.105
102

David Luban, Risk Taking and Force Protection, in READING WALZER (Itzhak
Benbaji & Naomi Sussman eds., 2011)
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Luban defines the marginal risk to soldiers (or civilians) as the difference
between the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers use more discriminating
tactics and the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers use less discriminating
tactics. Id. at [20].
104

In this context, the marginal risk to soldiers (or civilians) is the difference
between the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers take some precaution and
the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers do not take that precaution.
105

In the target verification context, the marginal risk to soldiers (or civilians) is
the difference between the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers obtain more
information and the risks to soldiers (or civilians) if the soldiers obtain less
information.
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The more important difference between Luban’s proposal and my
own is that I ground the duty of soldiers to accept risks to themselves rather
than impose risks on civilians on the moral asymmetry between killing and
letting die, while Luban grounds this duty on “the vocational core of
soldiering.”106 I suspect that professional obligation is an infirm point on
which to balance risk to soldiers and risk to civilians. Evidently,
professional obligations are created, sustained, and defined by social
conventions including laws, codes of conduct, and custom. Yet the laws of
armed conflict are indeterminate, rules of engagement vary with each
armed force and each armed conflict, and state practice as a result remains
unsettled. Moreover, an armed force may opt out of whatever convention
exists, rejecting the professional obligations associated with it, and
construct their professional identity through a different set of norms,
values, and ideals.107 Of course, defecting from a social convention can be
a moral wrong in itself, if the convention has a compelling moral
justification.108 However, the most compelling moral justification for the
social convention that Luban supports is the moral asymmetry between
killing and letting die.
From a soldier’s perspective, the marginal risk to civilians is the
marginal risk of killing the civilians, while the marginal risk to soldiers is
the marginal risk of allowing them to be killed. The risk is not simply that
an equivalent harm will befall either a civilian or a soldier, but rather that
the soldier will commit a more serious moral wrong or a less serious moral
wrong. Luban treats the death of a soldier and the death of a civilian as
equally bad events, an equal loss of human life, and it is only the soldier’s
professional obligations that require her to risk the former before risking
the latter. But this is misleading. Killing a civilian is an action, not merely
an event, and the moral weight of an action is a function not only of its
outcome but also of its causal and intentional structure. Soldiers should
accept greater risks to themselves in order to avoid imposing smaller risks
106

Luban, at 28.
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Similarly, McMahan goes somewhat astray when he argues that “[t]he reason
why combatants are required to expose themselves to risk in the course of
defending those who are threatened with wrongful harm is simply that it is their
job to do that: it is what they have pledged to do and are paid to do. It is part of
their professional role.” McMahan, at 366. The goal of the inquiry is to determine
what level of risk the role-based duties of soldiers should require soldiers to accept,
and on pain of circularity this determination cannot rest on the role-based duties of
soldiers to accept risk.
108

See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, TORTURE, TERROR, AND TRADE-OFFS 80 (2010).
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on civilians, not because the lives of civilians are worth more than the lives
of soldiers but because killing is worse than letting die.109
V. IMPLEMENTATION
This part distills the complex moral principles defended in the
previous parts into relatively simple rules that soldiers can be trained to
follow even under fire. Section A proposes new LOAC/IHL rules as well
as reinterpretations of existing LOAC/IHL rules. Section B translates these
legal rules into model Rules of Engagement for training soldiers and
guiding their conduct on the battlefield.
A. LOAC/IHL
The most elegant way to incorporate the moral principles defended
in the previous parts into the LOAC/IHL would be for states to adopt three
new legal rules either as part of a new international convention or as the
basis for new customary international law. The first rule would essentially
codify the Galić dictum:
[A] person shall not be made the object of
attack when it is not reasonable to believe,
in the circumstances of the person
contemplating the attack, including the
information available to the latter, that the
potential target is a combatant.110
In addition, a new rule could be adopted regarding the level of certainty
required above the reasonable belief threshold:
A person shall not be made the object of
attack unless the risk to attacking forces of
sparing that person, or the reasonably
anticipated concrete and direct military
advantage of attacking that person, is
substantially greater than the risk that the
person is a civilian.
109

Luban invokes the asymmetry between killing and letting die in a separate
discussion of whether soldiers may unintentionally kill foreign civilians to prevent
their own civilians from being killed, Luban at [33], but not to determine when
soldiers may risk killing civilians to reduce the risk of being killed themselves.
110

Galić, para. 50.
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Finally, a new legal standard could be adopted to govern precautions in
attack generally:
Attacking forces shall take every effective
precaution to spare civilians unless taking
a precaution will increase the risk to
attacking forces substantially more than
taking that precaution will decrease the
risk to civilians.
These three rules would identify both the level of certainty that soldiers
must achieve and the level of risk that soldiers must accept. By following
these rules soldiers can ensure that their use of lethal force will prove either
justified (if the targeted individual turns out to be a combatant) or excused
(if the targeted individual turns out to be a combatant).
Alternatively, existing legal rules could be interpreted by states as
well as by international courts to reflect the relevant moral principles. As
we saw in part I, Protocol I fails to specify either the level of certainty
necessary to ‘verify’ that an individual or object is military rather than
civilian or the level of risk that is ‘feasible’ for soldiers to accept in order to
discharge their precautionary obligations. The principle of verification
could be interpreted along the following lines:
Those who plan or decide upon an attack
shall
(i) do everything possible to verify
that the persons to be attacked are not
civilians but are combatants unless seeking
additional information would increase the
risk to soldiers substantially more than
obtaining such information would
decrease the risk to civilians;
(ii) do everything necessary to
verify that the persons to be attacked are
more likely combatants than civilians;
(iii) do everything necessary to
verify that the persons to be attacked are
sufficiently likely to be combatants that
the risk of sparing them is substantially
greater than the risk that they are civilians.
These specifications reflect the complementary goals of error reduction and
error distribution: soldiers should gather as much reliable information as
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they can without increasing the risk to themselves substantially more than
they would decrease the risk to civilians; and soldiers must put themselves
and their mission at as much risk as necessary to achieve the required level
of certainty.
We also saw that the principle of doubt either fails to identify the
standard of certainty relevant to targeting decisions, sets that standard too
low, or permits the standard to vary without limitation based on the relative
costs of error. Instead, the principle of doubt should set a minimum
threshold of certainty and allow the required level of certainty to vary only
above that threshold:
In case of doubt whether a person is a
civilian, that person shall be considered to
be a civilian unless there is reason to
believe that she is probably a combatant; a
person may be attacked only if any
remaining doubt is sufficiently small that
the risk of sparing her is substantially
greater than the risk that she is a civilian.
Similarly, the principle of apparent protection seems to permit a soldier to
carry out an attack unless it becomes subjectively apparent to the soldier
that the target is almost certainly not a combatant but rather a civilian. This
principle should be interpreted to require that, at a minimum,
An attack shall be cancelled or suspended
if there is reason to believe that the
objective is probably not a military one or
is probably subject to special protection.
Interpreting existing LOAC/IHL rules along these lines will incorporate
into international law the minimum threshold of reasonable belief
applicable in all cases; the required level of certainty applicable when the
threshold has been satisfied; and the level of risk required to avoid
mistakenly killing civilians.
B. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
The new rules and interpretations of existing rules proposed above
enhance the determinacy of existing LOAC/IHL. However, here as
elsewhere the price of greater determinacy is greater complexity. While
military commanders and operational planners often will have access to
legal advisors, we cannot expect soldiers under fire to apply complex legal
standards to every targeting decision they make. Instead, military
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commanders should issue Rules of Engagement (ROE), written in ordinary
language, which soldiers can be trained to apply in combat. Such ROE will
inevitably simplify the underlying LOAC/IHL rules, but such
simplification is legitimate so long as soldiers will better conform to the
LOAC/IHL rules indirectly, by following the ROE, than directly, by
attempting to apply the LOAC/IHL rules under adverse conditions.
In general, soldiers need just one rule:
Don’t shoot anyone unless
(a) you reasonably believe that he
poses an immediate threat to several
members of your unit or to several
civilians;
(b) you are reasonably certain that
he poses an immediate threat to yourself,
another member of your unit or a civilian;
or
(c) you are convinced that he is a
combatant, even though he poses no
immediate threat to you or others.
In the vast majority of engagements, individual soldiers will make better
decisions by following this ROE than by attempting to calculate the
required level of certainty on a case-by-case basis, balancing military and
humanitarian considerations adjusted by the moral asymmetry between
killing and letting die. By contrast, the teams of military and intelligence
personnel who remotely operate UAVs generally have the time, resources,
personal safety, and direct access to legal advisors needed to make more
precise judgments and directly follow the LOAC/IHL norms proposed in
the previous section.
Importantly, in special operations targeting a high-level combatant
the long-term danger of sparing that combatant may be very high even if
that combatant poses no immediate threat. In such cases, it may be
appropriate for commanders to issue mission-specific ROE permitting
soldiers to intentionally kill an individual whom they reasonably believe to
be that particular combatant even if the individual poses no immediate
threat. However, it is impermissible to intentionally kill an individual
whom you do not reasonably believe is a particular combatant unless
killing that particular combatant would prevent far greater harm to others
before a better opportunity to kill that combatant arises.
The United States and its allies have issued ROE that substantially
overlap with the ROE proposed above. For example, ROE issued to
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coalition forces in Iraq in 2005 provide that “Positive Identification (PID)
is required prior to engagement. PID is a reasonable certainty that the
proposed target is a legitimate military target.”111 It is not clear, however,
whether under this ROE “a reasonable certainty” requires soldiers to
achieve a specific, moderately high level of certainty or merely directs
soldiers to achieve whatever level of certainty seems reasonable under the
circumstances. Evidently, soldiers receive greater guidance when they are
told what level of certainty to achieve than when they are told to figure out
for themselves what level of certainty to achieve. Moreover, a variable
standard of certainty would introduce all the problems of the Balancing
Approach directly into the ROE. On the other hand, a single standard of
‘reasonable certainty’ may prove too restrictive when the stakes are very
high, too permissive when the stakes are very low, and too vague standing
alone. The proposed ROE is intended to give soldiers specific guidance in
recurring situations, limit the inherent vagueness of language by situating
each level of certainty in relation to the others, and not overwhelm soldiers
with rules that are too fine-grained to apply under pressure. Finally, the
U.S. has permitted soldiers to intentionally kill individuals without
positively identifying them as legitimate targets, for example in ‘free-fire
zones’ from which civilians have been warned to leave as well as in
buildings or areas declared ‘hostile’ prior to attack. By contrast, the rules
proposed above permit no such derogation.
In his own work on targeting, Rogers proposes the following ROE:
Are you sure that the target is a military
objective? If you are in any doubt, would
you or friendly forces be placed in danger
if the attack were not carried out? If not,
the attack is NOT to be carried out.112
Though instructive, the ROE proposed by Rogers do not help soldiers who
are not sure that a target is a military objective (that is, they are in some
doubt) but who reasonably believe that friendly forces would be placed in
some danger if the attack were not carried out. How are soldiers supposed
to balance substantial doubts against substantial dangers, substantial risks
to civilians against substantial risks to soldiers? Rogers does not say. The
ROE proposed by Rogers are silent not only with respect to the likelihood
that the risks will materialize but also with respect to the magnitude of
111
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those risks. How much doubt is acceptable if many friendly soldiers would
be placed in danger if the attack were not carried out? Only a few? Only
oneself? On all of these questions the ROE proposed by Rogers are silent,
while the ROE proposed above offers meaningful guidance.
Importantly, the proposed ROE is intended to guide, not replace,
human judgment. That is why, like all ROE, the rule proposed must be
incorporated into Situational Training Exercises (STEs) in which soldiers
are taught to apply their ROE in scores of realistic combat simulations. In
addition, like all ROE, this rule can form the basis of (real and
hypothetical) case studies through which soldiers learn to recognize
scenarios in which the use of force is, or is not, appropriate. These
exercises will clarify any linguistic ambiguities in the wording of the ROE
and convert rules into reflexes. Soldiers must often rely on pattern
recognition as much as rule application, refined instinct as much as careful
calculation. So long as their training is grounded in sound legal and moral
norms, soldiers can trust themselves to make legally and morally sound
decisions even while under fire.113
CONCLUSION
This article began with two questions: First, how certain must a
soldier be that a given individual is a combatant and not a civilian before
attacking that individual? At a minimum, a soldier must reasonably believe
that the individual is a combatant and not a civilian. Above the reasonable
belief threshold, the required level of certainty will vary with the relative
costs of error and reflect the moral asymmetry between killing and letting
die. If an individual is not in a position to kill several soldiers or civilians
then that individual may not be attacked unless the attacker is reasonably
certain or even convinced that the individual is in fact a combatant.
Second, what risks must soldiers accept to themselves and to their
mission in order to reduce the risk of mistakenly killing civilians? Soldiers
must take whatever personal or operational risks are necessary to reach the
required level of certainty. Soldiers must also seek additional information
unless seeking additional information would increase the risk to the
soldiers substantially more than obtaining additional information would
decrease the risk the soldiers impose on civilians. If soldiers are unwilling
or unable to take the required risks then they must hold their fire.
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Unavoidably, this article has left several important questions
unanswered. How much worse is it to kill a civilian, intentionally and
unintentionally, than to allow one’s fellow soldiers to be killed? How
should we compare harm to civilians with military advantages other than
preventing harm to one’s fellow soldiers? These are difficult questions that
any morally serious approach to armed conflict must address.114
Fortunately, the progress we have already made gives us reason to believe
that these questions also have answers.
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